

## NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND INDO-PAKISTAN RELATIONS

**SHARDUL PRASAD\* & PROF. SUKHWANT SINGH BINDRA\*\***

\*Research Scholar, Amity Institute of Social Sciences, Amity University Uttar Pradesh

\*\*Director Research, Amity Institute of International Studies, Amity University Uttar Pradesh

### *ABSTRACT*

*The experience of Cold War was that with the nuclearisation of the Soviet Union the possibility of direct military conflict between the two superpowers declined and the crises between them moved to the level of political ideology, economic growth and arms race. This experience does not apply to Indo-Pakistan conflict since 1998 when both countries declared themselves as full fledged nuclear powers. Indeed the conflict between India and Pakistan have never stopped but ebbed and flowed in peaks and turfs. The Sino-Pakistan military interoperability has grown in importance with the emergence of China on the world stage as an economic behemoth. Pakistan's revisionism and hostility manifested in the form of asymmetrical warfare has been India's major security concern, resulting in military and diplomatic crisis. In this article we have discussed the nuances of Indo-Pakistan conflict since the last four decades.*

### INTRODUCTION

From 1986-2016, six major crises have taken place between India and Pakistan. During this period these two countries became de facto nuclear powers. The five major crises were:

1. Brasstacks Crisis of 1986
2. Compound Crisis of 1989-90
3. Kargil Conflict of 1999
4. Twin Peaks Crisis of 2001-02
5. 26/11 attack on Mumbai in 2008
6. September 2016 attack in Uri and the resulting Indian cross LOC surgical strikes.

There are two schools of thought which explain why these crises did not lead to full scale war. These two schools of thought have been called as optimist and pessimist camps<sup>i</sup>.

Kenneth Waltz has been the first person to articulate the optimistic attitude towards nuclear weapons. He has based his argument on the classic deterrence theory that two major powers with similar capacities normally do not go for war<sup>ii</sup>.

On the other hand, Scott Sagan, David J. Karl and Jordan Seng take the opposite view. These scholars have explained their negative attitudes towards nuclear weaponization in view of inherent limits of organizational reliability theory. Scott Sagan maintains that misperception and mistake creep in all social organizations, more so in military systems when it is on war-path: "nuclear weapons do not produce perfect nuclear organizations; they only make their inevitable mistakes more deadly. Because of the inherent limits of organizational reliability, the spread of nuclear weapons is more to be feared than welcomed"<sup>iii</sup>.

Here we discuss six Indo-Pakistan crises under the shadow of nuclear weapons without taking optimistic and pessimistic standpoints. Our approach is that the nuclear weapons constituted one of many factors in the decision of the two countries not going to war. Somehow uneasy relations have existed since the last thirty years with every possibility that things may go wrong in future crises, despite the best effort of India to have a strategic via-media with Pakistan and China. There are several unresolved issues that may emerge in near future. The Border Agreement of 1992 with China may unravel with the opening of Karakoram Highway and other CPEC (China-Pakistan Economic Corridor) projects passing through Gilgit-Baltistan region.

The six Indo-Pakistan crises were not resolved in a satisfactory manner. But their outcome was politically and strategically acceptable to both the countries and the world at large. These crises point out the fragility of international relations and statecraft in the present highly interconnected world plagued with chronic economic stagnation.

### **BRASS-TACKS CRISIS-1986**

There is still an ambiguity as to why Army Chief General K Sundarji conceived the Operation Brass-tacks under the guidance of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. It has been speculated that one of the political ends of this crisis was a desire in New Delhi to warn Pakistan regarding its support for Khalistani insurgents in Indian Punjab<sup>iv</sup>.

Since early 1980's Khalistani militancy was indirectly supported by Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan with covert assistance of arms and ammunition. The Brass-tacks exercise was envisaged as a massive field maneuver with a total of 1, 50,000 troops and two independent armoured brigades with an amphibious exercise on the Gujarat Coast<sup>v</sup>.

Pakistan raised objections to Brass-tacks Exercise near its borders in Punjab and Rajasthan. It also brought its Army Reserves into the Shakargarh area near Amritsar, Fazilka and Ferozepur. The transfer of Pakistan's limited armoured reserves to locations north and south of the Punjab created alarm in New Delhi: that Pakistan might cut off the highway linking Jammu & Kashmir with the rest of India<sup>vi</sup>.

During 1986-87 the United States was determined to eject the USSR from Afghanistan. To this end, the US was working with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. In this situation India's Brass-tacks exercise appeared to President Reagan as based on misperception and completely out of tune with American aims of defeating the USSR in Afghanistan. Thus the US went on an overdrive to persuade India to roll back the Brass-tacks Operation. The US ambassador to India John Gunther Dean made a serious effort in defusing the crisis. Rajiv Gandhi willingly accepted the withdrawal of Brass-tacks exercise<sup>vii</sup>.

There was a deeper reason for Rajiv Gandhi accepting the American wishes. He came to power in November, 1984. Then he set the first priority of his foreign policy was to readjust India's relations with the two superpowers namely, the US and the Soviet Union. His second priority was to deal with the ethnic crisis in Sri-Lanka<sup>viii</sup>. To this end, a memorandum of understanding on technological cooperation between India and the US was envisaged but it soon ran into problems. For example, the US refused to supply the high technology supercomputer XMP-24 to the Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore. But New Delhi's desire to expand bilateral relations with the US remained practical; because then India was becoming a growing partner in Silicon Valley information Technology Revolution. It was in 1980's that India started sending its graduates of IITs and other engineering institutions to the Silicon Valley. The American IT companies lobbied for Indian IT companies like Tata consultancy Services, Wipro and others. Thus there existed a highly win-win situation for both the US and India.

After thirty years Brass-tacks Crisis appears to set the pattern of strategic culture of India<sup>ix</sup>. New strategic challenges from countries like the USA, Pakistan and China have come and India has been able to respond to its security issues in terms of its culture and domestic changes in the society. On the other hand, Pakistan has followed a single track revisionist attitude towards India and will remain so in the foreseeable future. Shiv

Shanker Menon says that India's foreign policy, "is marked by boldness in conception and caution in implementation"<sup>x</sup>.

### COMPOUND CRISIS 1989-90

According to Paul Bracken, "compound escalation involves starting a new conflict or crisis other than the original one. The Cuban Missile Crisis provides an example. Had the Soviets responded to Kennedy by threatening Berlin it would have been an example of compound escalation"<sup>xi</sup>.

The Compound Crisis of 1989-90 is also called Kashmir Crisis. The Indian political system was passing through a period of political instability. VP Singh was the Prime Minister of a coalition of various political parties in opposition to Congress. Mufti Mohammed Sayeed the prominent Kashmiri politician was the Minister for Home Affairs. The members of JKLF had kidnapped Rubaiya Sayeed the daughter of the Home Minister in December, 1989<sup>xii</sup>. During this period JN Dixit was India's High Commissioner to Pakistan. He maintains that it was a weakly cobbled together coalition government which was unable to decide how to get her released<sup>xiii</sup>.

This National Front government gave into the ransom demands of JKLF by releasing five terrorists who were in jails in Jammu and Kashmir. This created the impression that the government of India was weak and bogged down by the constraints of coalition politics. This impression existed not only in India and Pakistan but also in Washington DC.

Pakistan aggressively supported and supplied arms to the Kashmiri militants. In response India deployed infantry units in Punjab and J&K to protect transportation and communication lines. Then Pakistan further deployed two its corps across Punjab's southern border and Rajasthan; and further placed 1 corps across Punjab's northern borders with Kashmir.

In December 1989 Pakistan conducted an exercise called Zarb-e-Momin ie the strike of the faithful. At this time General Mirza Aslam Beg was the chief of Pakistan Army and Ghulam Ishaq Khan was the President. They wielded the actual power in the country<sup>xiv</sup>. The Zarb-e-Momin exercise was a celebration of Pakistan's military contribution to the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan that year. It was also intended to demonstrate the doctrine of offensive defence<sup>xv</sup>.

Vipin Narang is of the opinion that the subsequent material on Compound Crisis shows that General Beg made a deliberate strategy of catalyzing the American intervention on Pakistan's behalf in the crisis. He further maintains

that it is not clear as to what Pakistan's intention was; and what concessions it wanted from the US by manipulating its attention to control India<sup>xvi</sup>.

President George Bush (Sr.) took Pakistan's appeal for help in the crisis seriously. He sent a team of officials headed by the US Deputy National Security Advisor Robert M. Gates accompanied by Richard Haas (National Security Council aide) and John Kelly Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. This team is referred to as the Gates Mission.

Gates Mission first visited Islamabad in May, 1990 and warned Pakistani leaders that the US would not intervene on their behalf in the event of war with India; and obtained an assurance that Pakistani training camps for Kashmiri insurgents would be shut down which was not done. Gates Mission also met Prime Minister VP Singh and Minister for External Affairs IK Gujral to prevent India from going to war. From July 1990 onwards several rounds of foreign secretary level talks were held between India and Pakistan. Thus Gates Mission provided for both the parties to step back without losing face.

After the Russian withdrawal from Afghanistan as a consequence of Geneva Agreement of 1989, the US acquired the confidence that it could control both India and Pakistan as Russian support to India became non-existent.

After three decades of the conflict we are inclined to agree with Burrows and Windrem's assessment done in 1994 that the Compound Crisis was, "orchestrated by Pakistan in order to persuade the US to continue to supply it with conventional arms"<sup>xvii</sup>. By playing up the nuclear danger General Aslam Beg and President Ghulam Ishaq Khan wanted to retain Pakistan's special relationship with the US. But Pakistan's blackmail to the US did not work the way it wanted. George Bush (Sr) refused the US certification in 1990 that Pakistan did not have nuclear weapons. It was the first step of the US to say no to Pakistan<sup>xviii</sup>.

In retrospect it appears that from 1990 the US started having gradually a detached view on the Indo-Pakistan crises. So far it has been a slow and continuing process.

### **KARGIL CONFLICT OF 1999**

The Kargil Conflict was a war in which more than 1000 soldiers were killed. In the social science standard for coding conflict as a war 1000 casualties and more is referred to as war<sup>xix</sup>.

In February 1999 Prime Minister Vajpayee travelled to Lahore. He visited Minar-e-Pakistan, the memorial site where demand for Pakistan was first made in 1940. He signed the visitor's book with a much publicized statement: 'India and Indians have accepted the creation of Pakistan and wish it well'<sup>xx</sup>.

In a determined bid to sabotage the peace plan of Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif called the 'Lahore declaration'; Pakistan's Army Chief General Pervez Musharraf executed a plan to control the heights of Kargil Mountains so that National Highway 1A linking Srinagar to Leh could be permanently captured<sup>xxi</sup>.

It was a routine practice for both Indian and Pakistani forces to vacate posts located on the higher reaches of the mountains in October-November and return to it next spring. Some of these posts are at elevations ranging from 12000-17000 feet above sea level. Therefore troops of both the countries used to follow this pattern of deployment. The National Highway 1A passes through the town of Kargil and links places like Mushkoh, Drass, Batalik and Shyok.

In early February 1999 about 800 soldiers crossed over into the Indian side of LOC in the 150km long Kargil region<sup>xxii</sup>. When Indian soldiers returned in May 1999 the Indian patrol near Shyok sector was fired upon.

Soon Indian army realized that the intruders were not militants but well trained Pakistani troops in local civilian dress<sup>xxiii</sup>. Then full fledged war took place in which the forces of 15(Kashmir), 16(Jammu) corps were supported by Indian air power. In this mountain conflict Indian forces suffered heavy casualties. Gradually by end-June 1999 the Indian forces were able to dislodge the Pakistani intruders from the Kargil heights.

Nawaz Sharif decided to seek US intervention and on July 2,1999 Sharif placed a call to president Clinton and desired to visit Washington personally. President Clinton had got the information that the Pakistanis were preparing their nuclear arsenal for possible deployment<sup>xxiv</sup>.

In the meeting with President Clinton Nawaz Sharif explained his side of Kargil episode. Firstly, he pointed out that General Musharraf did not consult the Prime Minister about the secret deployment on the Kargil Mountains. This is still an open question. On the one side the Pakistani military always claimed that Sharif was fully in the picture concerning Kargil episode. Whereas Sharif equivocated on the matter, Husain Haqqani gives another side of the picture. Haqqani says that Benazir Bhutto told him that, 'when Musharraf was director-general military operations, he had proposed a similar maneuver to her but, as prime minister, she had overruled the idea, asking Musharraf to consider the political consequences of his plan'. This conversation between the Prime Minister and

the Chief of Army Staff took place in 1995. Haqqani further says, "whether Sharif mistakenly signed off on the venture or was never fully informed of its scope is still debated"<sup>xxv</sup>.

Husain Haqqani makes a doubled edged remark that either Nawaz Sharif did not understand the full implication of the Kargil deployment; he carelessly signed the order. Or he got himself deliberately tricked by signing the document to be on the same side of the military and political ethos of Pakistan.

Moreover, Nawaz Sharif told Clinton that he was worried about the military clashes taking place on the Kargil Mountains and by implication that if Pakistan were defeated then his fate as prime Minister was also at stake.

Bruce Riedel reports that president Clinton presented two options to Nawaz Sharif. Firstly, if Pakistan withdrew completely without any condition then the United States would assist with mediation. Otherwise if Pakistan did not agree to withdraw its forces from Kargil then the United States would make a public statement blaming Pakistan for the crisis<sup>xxvi</sup>. The next day in another one to one meeting Nawaz Sharif agreed to withdraw forces from the Kargil Mountains. President Clinton declared that he would take personal interest in resolving outstanding issues between India and Pakistan<sup>xxvii</sup>. This led to the resolutions of Kargil Conflict in July, 1999.

There are two issues that have emerged from the Kargil Conflict for which there appears to be no answers. Firstly, what was the motivation of General Musharraf and Pakistani military elite to create the Kargil conflict? One explanation is that Pakistani military started the Kargil Conflict in order to sabotage the Lahore Declaration of February, 1999.

Scholars have given piecemeal answer to this question. As India and Pakistan became declared nuclear powers; the American intelligentsia wanted another effort of the US to manage Pakistan as well as India. The US had imposed sanctions on both India and Pakistan after their nuclear tests in 1998.

President Clinton attempted to again engage India as well as Pakistan instead of punishing them. He instructed International Monetary Fund (IMF) to rescue Pakistan from its financial crisis. Similarly private foreign currency accounts which were frozen were eased<sup>xxviii</sup>.

On India's side Vajpayee realized that war was not an option for resolving Indo-Pakistan crisis. So he attempted a genuine effort towards starting a political process and extended a hand of friendship to Pakistan. In this effort he visited Minar-e-Pakistan in Lahore. In this process he was supported by all Indian political parties<sup>xxix</sup>.

The Kargil conflict shows that both Clinton as well as Vajpayee failed to understand the socio-political ethos of Pakistan. Pakistan's army represented Islam as Pakistan's ideology and its own role of defending both ideological and territorial frontiers of Pakistan.

There is no answer as to how India should deal with Pakistan? The instrument of deterrent diplomacy pursued by the US during the Kargil Crisis rightly deserves high praise. According to Bhumitra Chakma, "deterrence diplomacy may be defined as intense, focused diplomatic activities especially geared to forestalling crisis escalation and outbreak of large scale Indo-Pakistani war"<sup>xxx</sup>. The deterrence diplomacy is similar to another term "pivotal deterrence" coined by Timothy Crawford<sup>xxxi</sup>.

Both deterrence diplomacy as well as pivotal deterrence have two common qualities. This makes them differ from normal diplomacy. First, it is especially geared to preventing a possible nuclear war. Second, such a diplomacy can only be pursued by systemic powers. In the wake of Donald Trump presidency the US is on retreat and inward looking. Should another Kargil crisis take place is there a hegemon presided by an enlightened president like Clinton who can manage the crisis?

In the wake of Sino-Pakistan axis India is uncertain of the US capability regarding its capacity to pursue deterrence diplomacy. India has to gear itself to pursue its own deterrence diplomacy if needed to separate China from Pakistan.

### **TWIN PEAKS CRISIS OF 2001-02**

Operation Parakram started on December 18<sup>th</sup>, 2001. It was a military mobilization of India's strike corps from peacetime cantonments at Ambala, Bhopal and Mathura. It took several weeks for about 2,00,000 forces to move to the border and it remained posted for about a year. Pakistan responded by mobilising corps level forces and reserves across the international border.

The BJP government never gave the Indian military the authorization to cross the LOC and international border. Vajpayee government was very much exercised by the terrorist attack on Indian Parliament. Therefore it wanted full scale military response but in due course it realized that crossing the line of control could precipitate a wider conflagration or even a nuclear war.



Brajesh Mishra then the National Security advisor gave the reason for calling off Operation Parakram; that there was no such thing as limited war in Indo-Pakistan context. He said, ‘if you cross the Line of Control or Punjab border there is bound to be an all out war’<sup>xxxii</sup>.

In October 2002 Operation Parakram was officially called off and the three strike corps returned to their cantonments.

Twin Peaks Crisis refers to the deterioration of Indo-Pakistan relations after the failure of Agra talks in July, 2001. The crisis centered around two terrorist attacks. That is why it is called Twin Peaks crisis. The first crisis took place between December 13, 2001 and middle of January, 2002. The second took place from May 14 to the middle of June 2002. From December 2001 to October 2002 the Indian Army remained mobilized on the Indo-Pakistan border.

In July 2001 the Agra Summit took place between Prime Minister Vajpayee and President Musharraf which ended in failure. In September 2001 9/11 terror attack took place in the US. In October 2001, Pakistani terrorists attacked J&K State Assembly. On December 13<sup>th</sup> 2001, the same terrorist organization Jaish-e-Mohammed attacked Indian Parliament in which all the five terrorists and twelve security personnel were killed.

India accused Pakistan of organizing the attack through Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed and demanded that these two organizations be brought to book and their leaders be handed over to India<sup>xxxiii</sup>. India gave Pakistan a list of three demands:

1. Stop all terrorist activities of Lashkar and Jaish
2. Take their leadership into custody
3. Freeze their financial assets

President Musharraf rejected India’s demands. On December 18, 2001 Prime Minister Vajpayee met the Army Chief S. Padmanabhan who was also Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee along with Brajesh Mishra, the National Security Advisor. The Prime Minister ordered the mobilization of the army on the Indo-Pakistan border. Brajesh Mishra told the Army Chief that the detailed instructions regarding the conduct of the war would be given to him later on. This was never done<sup>xxxiv</sup>.

This military mobilization by India was given the codename Operation Parakram. It was a ten month long military standoff which finally ended on October 16<sup>th</sup>, 2002 without a shot being fired across the Indo-Pakistan international border.

Prime Minister Vajpayee stated in the Parliament that Pakistan had thrown a challenge to India which it accepted. He maintained that India was ready for a decisive battle<sup>xxxv</sup>. On the other hand, President Musharraf warned India that if the Indian troops crossed the LOC, Pakistan would use military force. Further Pakistan moved its Hatf-1 and Hatf-2 ballistic missiles near the Indian border<sup>xxxvi</sup>.

It was at this time the American forces were fighting Al Qaeda terrorists in Afghanistan. The support of Pakistan was very important to the US. President George.W.Bush sent the US Secretary of State Colin Powell to intervene in the dispute between India and Pakistan. He first met Musharraf and emphasized banning Jaish and Lashkar and to demobilize either side's forces on the international border.

On January 12, 2002 Musharraf went on television to outline his new policy on Kashmir. That Pakistan would give diplomatic and moral support to Jammu & Kashmir but, 'would not allow any organization to perpetuate terror in the garb of Kashmir cause'<sup>xxxvii</sup>. The Jaish and Lashkar were banned. Musharraf also announced that the terrorists identified by India would not be extradited.

Colin Powell came to India and met Vajpayee and other Indian leaders and emphasized the importance of talks between the two countries. With American intervention the artillery fire by Pakistan along LOC was reduced. India looked for further decline of Pakistan's belligerence in due course which did not take place.

For India it was a wait and see attitude and kept up its coercive pressure on Pakistan. It also became clear that Vajpayee realized that war with Pakistan would not work because both countries were nuclear powers<sup>xxxviii</sup>.

The relations between India and Pakistan again hot up in May, 2002. On May 14, 2002 the Pakistani militants attacked a bus and Indian Army camp in Kaluchak in Jammu killing thirty three family members of Army personnel including children.

The US was alert at this time and asked India not to break diplomatic relations with Pakistan at this time. The US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage soon visited Islamabad and Delhi. However cross border terrorism from Pakistan never came to a complete halt.

The militants attacked Indian posts in Kashmir and killed four soldiers. On May 21, 2002 Kashmiri separatist leader Abdul Ghani Lone was assassinated by terrorists. He was considered a moderate among the Kashmiri separatist leadership i.e. Hurriyat Conference<sup>xxxix</sup>.

New Delhi had no alternative but to give a war threat to Pakistan in response to the Kaluchak killings. President George W. Bush of US personally intervened and desired that Pakistan must stop terrorist attacks across the line of Control. As a result President Musharraf instructed the ISI to stop Jehadi activities in Kashmir<sup>xl</sup>. Thus American mediation lessened Jihadist activity in J&K to the satisfaction of India.

Operation Parakram was a failure because President Musharraf did not keep his promise to control the Jaish and Lashkar terrorists. Moreover, India was not ready to fight a conventional war or risk a nuclear war. Praveen Swami quotes General S. Padmanabhan's remark who was then Chief of Army Staff: " If you really want to punish someone for something very terrible he has done, you smash him. You destroy his weapons and capture his territory. War is a serious business and you don't go just like that. When December 13<sup>th</sup> happened, my strike formations were at peace locations. At that point, I did not have the capability to mobilize large forces to go across"<sup>xli</sup>.

Rajesh Basrur also maintains that Operation Parakram was a failure because the coercive diplomacy did not work in the nuclear environment of India and Pakistan<sup>xlii</sup>.

On the other hand, Feroz Hassan Khan has presented the debate in Pakistan regarding use of nuclear weapons in Operation Parakram. On April 8, 2002 the London Times correspondent Roger Boyes published the oft quoted interview with Musharraf that he might use nuclear weapons if India had an upper hand in war with Pakistan. In the interview Musharraf said," Nuclear Weapons are the last resort. I am optimistic and confident that we can defend ourselves with conventional means, even though the Indians are buying up the most modern weapons in frenzy. Nuclear weapons could be used if Pakistan is threatened with extinction"<sup>xliii</sup>.

So far there is no evidence that Indian leaders as well as Army Brass reacted to the threat of Musharraf. However, we presume that they must have noted Pakistan's threat of using nuclear weapon in a conflict. On the other hand Washington was acutely aware of the assumption that if war started between the two countries then there might be the use of nuclear weapons more by escalation and miscalculation than by design. Colin Powell in an interview with NBC TV stated that Indo-Pakistan conflict could spiral out of control<sup>xliv</sup>.

The question remains as to why Prime Minister Vajpayee and National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra did not take into account the nuclear aspect of an Indo-Pakistan war. In fact Prime Minister Vajpayee wanted to carry out atleast limited strikes against the terrorist training camps in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. The counter factual argument is that the Kargil War was fought in the shadow of nuclearization of the two countries but the use of nuclear weapons did not come into picture. In the same way, Indian leaders did not consider the play of nuclear weapons in the Exercise Parakram; though on the other hand Pakistan and the US were acutely aware of war that might take place in a nuclear context. Moreover, 26/11 attack on Mumbai brought out the hard reality that India did not have the means to stop terrorist attack in the country. India was still on a learning curve of fighting asymmetric, conventional and nuclear war together.

### 26/11 ATTACK ON MUMBAI

26/11 attack on Mumbai in November, 2008 was executed by ten Pakistani terrorists of whom one was caught alive. This was a precision commando attack done by Lashkar-e-Toiba aided by Pakistani intelligence agency ISI. This terror siege continued for three days in which 166 people were killed and 308 injured.

Husain Haqqani provides a rationale that led Pakistani ISI to execute 26/11 attack on Mumbai<sup>xlv</sup>. He gives a personal anecdote leading to the event. When Yousuf Raza Gilani became the Pakistani Prime Minister and Asif Zardari the President in 2008, Husain Haqqani was appointed ambassador-at-large by the Prime Minister. He came to know about back channel negotiations between India and Pakistan during General Musharraf's regime, in the period 1999-2007. The Indian negotiator was Satinder K Lambah. Pakistani Foreign Secretary Riaz Mohammed Khan informed Haqqani that indeed the back channel negotiations had taken place but there was no record of it in his office.

Haqqani says, "Riaz Mohammed Khan referred me to army chief General Ashfaq Kayani, who had previously headed the ISI, only to be told that it might be best for negotiations to start afresh. If a deal had indeed been agreed to by Musharraf, the Pakistani military was not prepared to let that deal go through"<sup>xlvi</sup>.

In 2008, the civilian government came to power in Pakistan through democratic process and it completed its full term, the first time it happened in Pakistan's history. The main reason for civil-military compromise was that Pakistan's foreign policy, nuclear policy as well as Indo-Pakistan relations remained subject to a military veto. After becoming President Asif Zardari declared regional integration among SAARC countries as one of his priorities and expressed willingness to abjure the doctrine of first use of nuclear weapons. The 26/11 attack was to

stop the civilian government to have any autonomy beyond the wishes of the Pakistani Army. That is why the commando attack took place within a couple of months of Zardari's election.

The question arises: was Manmohan Singh's government aware of General Kayani's thinking on India-Pakistan relations? Shiv Shankar Menon, the National Security Advisor under Manmohan Singh government has written extensively on restraint used by India in the Mumbai attack. But he does not give any inkling regarding Pakistan's military thinking after the departure of General Musharraf as President. This shows that Indian intelligence as well as India's foreign office in Islamabad and New Delhi took for granted the restoration of democracy in Pakistan.

After the 26/11 attack Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Army Chief Deepak Kapur conceded that there was no way to retaliate against Pakistan in a forceful manner without provoking nuclear war.

Shiv Shankar Menon points out that diplomatic as well as international climate called India for restraint<sup>xlvii</sup>. He maintains that a thorough discussion among the officials of foreign office in consultation with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Minister of External Affairs Pranab Mukherjee took place for several days. They finally reached the conclusion of not retaliating against Pakistan militarily, and to concentrate on diplomatic, covert and other means to pursue India's interest. He gives three reasons that went against India not attacking Pakistan. The first was India's experience of Kashmir issue in the UN Security Council in 1948. India went as a complainant to the Security Council but since the last seventy years the body played politics and treated aggressor and victim as equals and brought forth the idea of unimplementable plebiscite. Both the US and UK favoured Pakistan at the cost of India.

Shiv Shanker Menon maintains that had India attacked Pakistan then the US with the help of the Security Council would have imposed ceasefire in the name of evenhandedness. It was at this time the US was busy in interfering and destabilizing Afghanistan. So it needed the help of Pakistan in men, material as well as corridor.

Secondly, Menon maintains that an Indian attack would have united people of Pakistan behind the Pakistan Army. The civilian elected government of Asif Zardari was already weak. A war would have resulted in his civilian government being overthrown by the military.

Thirdly, a limited strike on terrorist targets on LET headquarters in Muridke and training camps in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir would not have worked. The LET camps were in tin sheds and huts deliberately built very close to hospitals and schools. Therefore, a strike by India on these camps would have meant heavy civilian

casualties. That would have created adverse worldwide reaction against India. Therefore, Manmohan Singh government openly abjured military strikes on Pakistan.

Menon also recounts the consequences of Pakistani attack on Mumbai. Firstly, the world for the first time became aware of the most well documented terror attack anywhere in the world<sup>xlvi</sup>. The three day television spectacle of the commando style attack and conversations between the terrorists and their Pakistan based handlers clearly highlighted the Pakistani state angle of the attack. 26/11 was in the same league as global terrorist attacks such as 9/11. Foreign nationals were among those killed and injured.

Secondly, the US was not very active in mediation because David Headley the US national of Pakistani origin visited Mumbai seven times on behalf of ISI and LET. That showed that the US knew something about the 26/11 conspiracy but did not inform India in advance. It used its diplomacy to shield the role of its intelligence agencies who used Headley as an agent.

Thirdly, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states provided unprecedented cooperation in handing over the culprits who ran away to these countries. 26/11 attack brought home to India the hard realities of international relations that Great Powers like US would never yield on their key security interests.

### **MODI-DOVAL DOCTRINE OF OFFENSIVE DEFENCE, SURGICAL STRIKES AND COMPELLENCE**

When Narendra Modi became Prime Minister he invited all the south Asian leaders during his swearing in ceremony in May, 2014. Modi was keen to have a new breakthrough in Indo-Pakistan relations. As a reciprocal gesture Modi attended the wedding ceremony of the granddaughter of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in Lahore. This brought a great hope between the people of the two countries that their frozen relations would get a new lease of life. In Lahore both the Prime Ministers decided to have meetings between the Foreign Ministers and Foreign Secretaries of the respective countries. Immediately after this Lahore visit of Prime Minister Modi; Pakistani terrorists of Jaish-e-Mohammed attacked the Pathankot Air Base in January, 2017 whose bitterness continues till this day.

In retaliation to the terrorist attack on the Indian Army's brigade headquarters at Uri; India conducted surgical strikes on seven terror launch pads right from Bhimber (near Akhnoor) to Kel (near Kupwara) on September 29, 2016 in which a large number of Pakistani Army regulars and jihadi irregulars were killed, their launch pads were destroyed.

This pre-emptive ground based surgical strikes are a watershed in India's military history of the last seventy years. The Modi-Doval doctrine of offensive defence is part of a larger strategy of using hard and soft power options to compel Pakistan to give up its sponsorship of terrorism or asymmetrical warfare.

The surgical strikes are significant from several points of view. Firstly, it reveals a shift in the strategic thinking from a purely defensive and deterrence oriented on to a compellence which aims to discourage Pakistani support to terror<sup>xlix</sup>.

Lashkar-e-Toiba's fedayeen attack on 26 November 2008 in Mumbai had left India stunned. One of the suicide attackers, who was captured alive revealed the complicity of the ISI in training and launching the terrorists. However, India did not respond militarily to the terrorist outrage. The Indian strategic doctrine of that time i.e. strategic restraint was thought of as a better option. This doctrine sought to present India as a responsible nuclear weapon state.

Firstly, the surgical strikes of September 29 broke this self imposed barrier of restraint in favour of more robust military options like cross LOC Special Forces led operations. It is a new factor which is likely to aggravate Indo-Pakistan conflict. Up till now India did not conduct large-scale cross border retaliatory attacks in response to Pakistani terrorist provocations. The aftermath of Uri clearly reveals the fact that the Pakistani deep-state (jihadis) and the military establishment are unlikely to give up their strategy of bleeding India by giving thousand cuts despite retaliation.

Secondly, the surgical strikes against Pakistani terrorist targets reveal both the strengths and weaknesses of Indian military capabilities. Pakistani terrorists attacked the Uri camp on September 18 and India retaliated on September 29. The delay of ten days in punitive retaliation points out that India's military capacity in terms of C4ISR (Command and Control Communications Computers Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance) is yet to fully develop.

India in future may have to strike terror launch pads deeper in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir and Pakistani heartland itself. The question is whether India has acquired the requisite military and strategic capabilities to conduct surgical strikes deeper into Pakistan; while at the same time preventing nuclear and conventional war as well as managing the diplomatic fallout.

Thirdly, India has also been employing soft power and diplomacy to give strong message to Pakistan. India is thinking about using water as a weapon to coerce Pakistan by abrogating the Indus Waters Treaty. The meetings

of the Indus Commission have been discontinued. The abrogation of the treaty is symbolic since it will take more than ten years to build canals and dams to divert the waters of the Indus System.

On the diplomatic front India succeeded in getting the SAARC Summit cancelled which was to be held in Islamabad in 2016. For this India has got the support of other SAARC members like Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Sri-Lanka and Nepal.

India has its task cut-out in managing its relations with the Great Powers/Permanent Members of the UN Security Council like US, China and Russia. The US-Pakistan relations are currently in deep freeze due to the latter's support of Afghan Taliban. The US is gradually coming around to India's view of pressurizing Pakistan to end its asymmetrical war strategy.

On the other hand though Russia supports India's view on terrorism nevertheless it is coming closer to China and developing a nascent military-to-military relationship with Pakistan. China remains India's major concern due to its all weather friendship and military-nuclear relationship with Pakistan. It remains one of the few states besides Saudi-Arabia who continue to support Pakistan's Kashmir position. China has even blocked India's initiative in the UN to ban Jaish-e-Mohammed and entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

The Modi-Doval doctrine of offensive-defence and compellence in relation to Pakistan is a developing security idea; which meshes together the elements of hard and soft power to persuade Pakistan to give up its strategy of using terrorism as an instrument of state policy.

## END NOTES

1. Sumit Ganguly and S.Paul Kapur (eds), Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: Crisis Behaviour and the Bomb, Asian Security Studies, 2007, pp127
2. Kenneth Waltz, "the Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May be Better", Adelphi Papers 171( London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981)
3. a) Scott D Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, WW Norton, New York, 1995, p136  
 b) David J Karl, "Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers", International security 21, no:3(Winter 1996-97):pp 87-119;  
 c) Jordan Seng, "Less is more: Command and Control Advantages of Minor Nuclear States," Security Studies 6, no:4 (Summer 1997): pp 50-92



4. John H Gill, "Brasstacks: Prudently Pessimistic", in Sumit Ganguly and S Paul Kapur(eds), Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: Crisis Behaviour and the Bomb, Asian Security Studies, 2007, pp 37-39
5. John H Gill, Ibid, p40
6. K Raja Menon, Nuclear Strategy for India, New Delhi, Sage, 2000, p98
7. P R Chari, Pervez Iqbal Cheema, Stephen P Cohen, Four Crises and a Peace Process, Washington DC, Brookings institution Press, 2007, pp39-79
8. J N Dixit, India's Foreign Policy: 1947-2003, Picus Books, 2003, pp172-174
9. John H Gill, ibid, p42
10. Shiv Shanker Menon, Choices: Inside the Making of India's Foreign Policy, Penguin Books, 2016, p 134
11. Paul Bracken, The Second Nuclear Age: Strategy, Danger and the new Power Politics, St Martin Griffen, New York, 2012, p133
12. Shiv Shanker Menon, Ibid, p198
13. Manjeet Pardesi, Nuclear Optimism and the 1990 India-Pakistan Crisis, in Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: Crisis behavior and the Bomb, Sumit Ganguly and S Paul Kapur(eds), Asian Security Studies, 2007, p62
14. J N Dixit, India-Pakistan in War and Peace, London, Routledge, 2002, p271
15. Stephen P Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2005, pp 146-149
16. Vipin Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Mordern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, pp 65-69
17. William E Burrows and Robert Windrem, Critical Mass: The Dangerous Race for Superpowers in a Fragmenting World, Simon&Schuster, New York, 1994, p83
18. Karthika Sasikumar, "Crisis and Oppurtunity: The 1990 Nuclear Crisis in South Asia" in Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: Crisis Behaviour and the Bomb, Sumit Ganguly and S Paul Kapur(eds), Asian Security studies, 2007, p 94
19. C. Christine Fair, Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War, Oxford University Press, 2014, p150
20. S Paul Kapur, Nuclear Proliferation and the Kargil Conflict, South Asian Security Studies 13, No:1;79-105, 2003
21. Hussain Haqqani, India Vs Pakistan: Why Can't We Just Be Friends?, Juggernaut Books, 2016, p82
22. Bhumitra Chakma, South Asia's Nuclear Security, Routledge, 2015, p44
23. Bruce Riedel, American Diplomacy and 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania centre for Advanced study of India, 2002, p11

24. Hussain Haqqani, Ibid, p85-86
25. Feroz Hassan Khan, Ibid, p313
26. Feroz Hassan Khan, Ibid, p313
27. Husain Haqqani, Ibid, p82-83
28. Praveen Sahwney & Ghazala Wahab, Dragon on our Doorstep : Managing China through military power, Aleph Book Company, 2017, p 174-175
29. Bhumitra Chakma, Ibid, p56
30. Timothy Crawford, Pivotal Deterrence : Third Party Statecraft and the Pursuit of Peace, Ithaca, New York : Cornell University Press, 2003
31. Vipin Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict, Princeton University Press, 2014, p278
32. Kanti Bajpai, To War or not to War: The India-Pakistan Crisis of 2001-02, Ibid, pp 163-164
33. Praveen Sahwney and Ghazala Wahab, Dragon on our Doorstep: Managing China through Military Power, Aleph Book Company, New Delhi, 2017, p 164
34. Kanti Bajpai, Ibid, p164
35. Nico Beck and Martine Cicconi, Chronology of twin Peaks Crisis, in Nayak and Krepon, US Crisis Management, in South Asia's twin peaks Crisis, Report 57, Washington DC: Stimson Centre, September 2006, p49
36. Kanti Bajpai, Ibid, p 166
37. Praveen Swami, Ibid, pp 151-152
38. Mukhtar Ahmed, Geelani abetted Abdul Ghani Lone's assassination: Sajjad Lone, Rediff.com, July 8, 2003, available at <http://www.rediff.com/news/2003/jul/08jk.htm>
39. Hassan Abbas, Pakistan's drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army and America's War on Terror, Armonk: ME Sharpe, 2005, p225
40. Praveen Swami, General Padmanabhan mulls over Lessons of Operation Parakram, The Hindu, February 6, 2004, available at <http://www.hindu.com/2004/02/06/stories/2004020604461200.htm>
41. Rajesh Basrur, Coercive Diplomacy in a Nuclear Environment, in Rafiq Dossani and Henry S Rowen(eds), Prospects of Peace in South Asia, New Delhi, Orient Longman, 2006, p318
42. Feroz Hassan Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb, Foundation Books, new Delhi, 2014, p352
43. Bhumitra Chakma, South Asia's Nuclear Security, Routledge, London, 2015, p118
44. Husain Haqqani, India Vs Pakistan: Why Can't We Be Just friends, Juggernaut Books, New Delhi, 2016, pp 94-96
45. Husain Haqqani, Ibid, pp 95-96

46. Shiv Shanker Menon, Ibid, pp 90-103
  47. Stephen P Cohen, An Unclean Slate, The Indian Express, 4<sup>th</sup> October 2016
-



