

## SINO-PAKISTAN RELATIONS: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE

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### *ABSTRACT*

*Since the independence of India and Pakistan, the relations between the two countries are entrenched in endemic conflicts based on Pakistan's narcissistic feeling of existential threat from Hindu India. On the other hand, Pakistan-China relations were established in 1951. Since then the relations between the two countries have grown and deepened. In the course of time, China replaced the US as the most reliable friend; first as a strategic partner against India then as a nuclear and missile proliferator to Pakistan. In recent years, the Chinese policy of One Belt One Road (OBOR) with \$46 billion investment in Pakistan has catalyzed the major long term power shifts in favour of Pakistan. It would make China the hegemon of Asia.*

For the Pakistani military, the emergence of nuclear jihad is a way to overturn territorial status quo and undermine India's ascent. The three wars between India and Pakistan ended with a particular pattern that neither the US nor China directly intervened, and they kept the outward semblance of neutrality. The Kargil Conflict took place under the shadow of nuclearisation of both these countries. The US overtly and China indirectly pressurized Pakistan to withdraw from the Kargil heights. Now with the emergence of Donald Trump's policy of "America First", the US more or less is on retreat from the affairs of South Asia. China naturally fills in the gap and becomes the sole Great Power to manage India-Pakistan relations; may be in a state of political antagonism but lessening the risk of full scale war. As a result China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is a strategic step to dominate India in a state of mistrust with China and to establish its supremacy in the countries of the Indian Ocean Region. Its economic value so far remains doubtful both for China and Pakistan.

At present China-Pakistan relationship is multi-dimensional. However, its original glue is Pakistan's search for parity with a bigger India in all aspects especially in the military-strategic sphere. Pakistan's policy has been motivated by so called existential threat from Hindu India. To this end, Pakistan's search for so called security cover has led it to join United States in the Cold War with USSR that continued for about fifty years. Similarly, Pakistan's attitude towards China represents the obsession of its elite that it should have good relations with it all costs because it is the biggest country in Asia and can be of help in its search for parity with India<sup>i</sup>. Pakistan was one of the first Muslim countries to recognize the People's Republic of China in 1949<sup>ii</sup>.

Since the partition of India in 1947 the basic premise of Pakistan's foreign policy has remained the same: that security against Bharat or "Hindu" India has been the key determinant for any relationship that Pakistan has pursued. Pakistan became a member of SEATO (South East Asia Treaty Organization) and Baghdad Pact (later called CENTO/Central Treaty Organization) in the 1950's not to stop USSR's expansion in Asia but to get the support of the US for countering India.

Therefore, during the Sino-Indian War of 1962 military aid given by US to India was seen by US to India was seen by Pakistan as betrayal. This would create military disparity between India and Pakistan. As a reaction, "in December 1962, Pakistan and China signed an agreement in principle on the location and alignment of the Sino-Pakistani boundary"<sup>iii</sup>. This agreement was signed in 1963.

Within months of this agreement two new agreements took place between china and Pakistan. One was concerned with trade and shipping facilities on the basis of most favoured nation status. It was an agreement based on barter system: Pakistan exporting cotton, cotton textiles, jute goods and products, leather goods, newsprint and would import metal and steel products, coal, cement, machinery, chemicals and raw materials. The other trade pact signed in 1963 was air agreement between the two countries. Pakistan was given rights at Canton, Shanghai and China at Karachi and Dhaka. These agreements on boundary, trade and air facility brought China and Pakistan closer to each other. Thus Sino-Indian war of 1962 created the basis for strategic cooperation between China and Pakistan.

Sino-Indian war of 1962 created the basis for strategic cooperation between China and Pakistan. China occupied Xinjiang in 1949 and Tibet in 1950. It laid claim to 3,400 sq miles of territory of J&K in Gilgit-Baltistan called Shaksgam Valley. China was also facing problems on its borders with both the USSR and India. Pakistani President Ayub Khan considered it a good opportunity to come closer to China. In 1963, Pakistan and China signed the agreement known as Sino-Pakistan Border Agreement and ceded Shaksgam Valley to China; thus

ending their border dispute. When India protested this agreement Pakistan claimed that it had accepted Chou-en-Lai's proposal for a comprehensive border settlement made in 1960. According to the Chinese proposal there would be a East-West territorial swap in which China would have control over Aksai Chin, India over southern slope of Eastern Himalayas and there would be a plebiscite in the rest of J&K held by India and Pakistan.

Nehru rejected the Chinese compromise formula<sup>iv</sup>. According to John W. Garver the Tibetan uprising in 1959 led to the Dalai Lama's journey to Tawang (Arunachal Pradesh). It made Beijing paranoid about India's policy towards Tibet as an autonomous region. It was this incident that cemented Sino-Pakistani all weather friendship and subsequent attack of China on India<sup>v</sup>.

The air agreement of 1963 proved to be the most beneficial to Sino-Pakistan relations. In 1970 US Secretary of State Kissinger took a secret flight to Beijing from Islamabad. This act earned Pakistani dictator Yahya Khan the gratitude and sympathy of President Nixon. Thus Pakistan became something like a middleman between the US and China<sup>vi</sup>. The period from 1970 to 2001 was the period when the US felt a general gratitude towards Pakistan. This goodwill between these two countries started declining after 9/11.

China has always used the strong arm of religious repression in East Turkestan such as closer of mosques, destruction of religious texts and restriction on Islamic education. But Pakistan has always sided with China by making superficial aspersions like fondness of drink as un-Islamic traits of Uighurs.

Scholars have pointed out that religious restrictions on Muslims in other parts of the world such as in France, Belgium have aroused angry street protests in Pakistan. But regarding religious restrictions imposed by China have never led to any protest in Pakistan<sup>vii</sup>. The Pakistani diplomats have defended their country's silence on the matter by the argument that India and United States are determined to drive a wedge between China and Pakistan<sup>viii</sup>.

On the other hand, Sino-Pakistan relations went on strengthening in a multi-dimensional fashion. Pakistan's unstinted support to China on the issue of Xinjiang earned a lasting bond of close cooperation between these two countries. The dissent in Xinjiang and urge of Uighurs to be independent of China still continue and will continue in future also. China has attempted to squash dissent in Xinjiang by getting ETIM (East Turkestan Islamic Movement) and ETIP (East Turkestan Islamic Party) banned and eliminated with the help of Pakistan.

In Rawalpindi, since the medieval times there used to be a mohalla (community centre) of the people of Xinjiang. They used to come to these places for pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina, and for religious education. Under the pressure of China, Pakistan closed down these community centres in late 1990's. These centres were Kashgarabad and Hotanabad in Rawalpindi, and Turkestani Mohalla in the Kachiabadi (slum) of Karachi<sup>ix</sup>.

Pakistan got moral support from China during the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War. The tone of Chinese denunciation of India was aggressive. But it did not give any military aid to Pakistan. The primary objective of China's bullying India was to secure a position of dominance in Asia which it did. 'The Chinese role in the war strengthened the Sino-Pakistan Axis and provided an opportunity to the government of China to return with thanks the support which she got from Pakistan during the Sino-Indian War of 1962'<sup>x</sup>.

Since 1965 the military relationship has been at the heart of China-Pakistan ties from a small beginning of helping Pakistan with military-industrial infrastructure in Taxila and supplying tanks, guns and ammunition. The relationship has grown into the nuclearization of Pakistan and it having full missile capabilities and development of submarines and establishment of military bases at Gwadar and Ormara (Baluchistan province of Pakistan).

On Pakistan's side there has been more sincerity than reciprocity. Whatever equipment the US supplied to Pakistan it was made available to China for reverse engineering such as F-16 fighter jets, P3C Orion anti-submarine aircraft in 2011. In 2011 Pakistan allowed the Chinese experts to examine and photograph the crashed American Blackhawk transport helicopter in Abbotabad. This points out that nuclear and defence cooperation was not a one way street<sup>xi</sup>.

There are two theories regarding the success of nuclear and missile programmes of Pakistan. According to Feroz Hassan Khan, 'the development of nuclear weapons by Pakistan would have succeeded but without Chinese assistance it would have taken longer'<sup>xii</sup>. On the other hand, Gordon Corera maintains that, 'If you subtract China's help there would not be a Pakistani nuclear programme'<sup>xiii</sup>.

Before Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was hanged in 1979 he wrote a pamphlet as a part of criminal appeal to the Supreme Court of Pakistan that his greatest contribution to Pakistan was his bilateral agreement concluded with China in June, 1976.<sup>xiv</sup>

The agreement took place in a meeting between Mao Zedong and Pakistani delegation led by Bhutto. Mao died few months later but the agreement assisting Pakistan in its nuclear programme has stuck and since then has been a part and since then has been a part and parcel of China's strategy to be sole great power in Asia.

After that AQ KHAN made several visits to Hanzhong near the ancient Chinese capital of Xian. In helping Pakistan, China got full opportunity to understand and learn from the clandestine uranium enrichment programme from AQ Khan's laboratory which is located in Kahuta, twenty miles east of Islamabad.

He briefed the Chinese on how the European designed centrifuges could benefit China's uranium enrichment programme. In due course, AQ Khan helped China in the development of inverters, valves and pressure gauges used in uranium enrichment programme. This was the beginning of the deepening of Sino-Pakistan nuclear collaboration.

Pakistan's missile technology is of Chinese and North Korean in origin. In 1988 India tested Prithvi short range ballistic missile (SRBM) and in 1989 Agni intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM). This prompted Pakistan to develop its own missile capability. Its Hatf-1 (SRBM) had a range of 80 km but was found to be an inaccurate ballistic missile. Hence Pakistan pleaded with China for help in developing ballistic and cruise missiles.

China decided to make Pakistan a rival to India in military capabilities<sup>xv</sup>. It gave latest models of M-11/DF-11 (Ghaznavi), M-9/DF-15 (Shaheen 1), M-18/DF-25 (Shaheen 2) ballistic missiles which have the following ranges-300km, 700km and 2000km. China also gave a reverse engineered turbo-fan powered long range cruise missile called CJ-10/DF-10 with range of 2000km; this missile is known as Babur in Pakistan. Pakistan also obtained technical knowhow of manufacturing liquid fueled medium range ballistic missile from North Korea called Ghauri/Nodong (range-1300km).

The collaboration between China and Pakistan in the field of nuclear and missile technology created deep bond of trust and loyalty of Pakistan to China. Scholars have differed on the motivation of China's one sided bounty of strategic power to Pakistan. According to Andrew Small China's support to Pakistan was an act of generosity because in due course, "the collaboration remains considerably less vital to Chinese interests than it is to Pakistan"<sup>xvi</sup>.

On the other hand, John J. Mearshimer explicates the psychology of China to claim that its rise is peaceful. He maintains that, "history has shown us that a rising power and an existing hegemon are unlikely to come to

peaceful accommodation, and applies this analysis to the US-China security competition in East Asia, suggesting that there exists here a great potential for war<sup>xxvii</sup>.

It is in this context China's attempt to arm Pakistan to the hilt to make it equal to India is a long diplomatic and strategic design in the emergence of China as the second great power after the US. Some Chinese scholars have criticized Mearshimer's contention that in history there has been no peaceful emergence of a great power.

President Xi Jinping is fully aware of the American apprehension. He has said: "we all need to work together to avoid the so called Thucydides trap-destructive tensions between an emerging power and established powers"<sup>xxviii</sup>. Thucydides (460-400 BC) was a historian and general of Athens. After his retirement as a general he wrote the history of Peloponnesian War. Xi Jinping's reference is to the fifth book of Thucydides where Athenians defeated the confederation of Melos. He maintains that Athens is strong and Melos is weak. Therefore the latter must submit without any bloodshed. His famous remark is: "strong do what they can and weak also suffer what they must"<sup>xxix</sup>.

Perhaps Xi Jinping is aware of Robert D Kaplan's interpretation of Thucydides remark to China's attempt to subjugate the countries of South China Sea<sup>xx</sup>. According to Jinping, the US represents the Western view of power transition which involves power struggle, conflict and a zero sum game. China's peaceful transition as a great power is based on the experience of Chinese civilization in which foreign powers came to China and merged their racial identities within the framework of Han Chinese civilization. This concept in Chinese is called tian xia,"which held that everything under the heavens belonged to the Chinese Empire. A superior civilization demanded deference and tribute from vassal neighbours and did not hesitate to use military force"<sup>xxi</sup>. Xi Jinping's interpretation of tian xia is that in the twenty-first century; China's peaceful rise as a great power would be good for the mankind. It is a Confucian balance between individual and society, between other powers and the Middle Kingdom.

Xi Jinping became the President of China in March, 2013. He gave the vision of China as a "harmonious society having peaceful rise"<sup>xxii</sup>. The term peaceful rise has a particular connotation with reference to the turmoil of China in 1980's. In the aftermath of the massacre in Tianamen square in 1989; Deng Xioping advised the Chinese leaders that they should take low profile in international affairs which is called four character Chinese diplomatic strategy in which he propounded that China should, "coldly observe, secure our positions, cope calmly, conceal our capabilities and bide our time, keep a low profile, never take the lead and make a contribution"<sup>xxiii</sup>.

Xi Jinping's slogan of "Peaceful Rise" indicates that Deng Xiaoping's advice of low profile is no longer relevant in the second decade of the twenty-first century. By 2010 China emerged as the second greatest power with a foreign exchange reserve of \$4 trillion and national income of \$11 trillion.

According to William Callahan the humiliation of China by the European Powers in the 19<sup>th</sup>-20<sup>th</sup> centuries destroyed the self-confidence of the Chinese people. It retarded their capacity to regain confidence, prosperity and power it had as the middle kingdom in the past<sup>xxiv</sup>. The Chinese intellectuals always lamented over the lost glory of China.

Hu Jintao was the President of China between 2002 and 2012. Under his leadership the idea of China dream had begun to take root. He propounded that 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing epitomized the emergence of China as a rich, civilized and socialist country. He maintained that Chinese people had a hundred year dream of industrialization and modernization.

Xi Jinping's plan of "One Belt One Road" represented the self confidence of China as a great power. He visited Pakistan in April 2015 and declared an aid package of \$46 billion to it. This event has been a watershed in India-China-Pakistan geopolitical triangle. It is also called China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). CPEC is a component of OBOR which seeks to link China's Pacific Coast with Europe and the Atlantic. This \$46 billion assistance is the biggest for any country in recent history. It surpasses the Marshall Plan assistance to Europe after the Second World War. Pakistan is the size of France whereas Marshall Plan was for the whole of Europe which is the size of India.

So far details have come out of only \$14.76 billion. What will happen to the rest of the projects worth \$31 billion? Following are the details of the CPEC projects<sup>xxv</sup>. The corridor has been planned with eleven projects and three alignments. A road starting from Urumqi goes to Gilgit-Baltistan and enters Pakistan at Suiki Kinari where a hydropower project with a budget of \$ 1.8 billion will be completed by 2020. About twenty miles down is Karote town where a hydropower project will be completed by 2020 at a cost of 1.5 billion.

From Karote town three alignments are proposed to be developed: eastern, central and western. In the eastern alignment, there will be a coal power project at Sahiwal at a cost of \$ 1.6 billion to be completed by 2017. In Muzaffargarh there will be a coal based power project at a cost of \$1.9 billion. Both will supply electricity to Punjab on a permanent basis. In Bahawalpur, there will be a solar park at a cost of \$1.33 billion to be completed by 2016.



In Sind there are three coal mining projects in the Thar Desert of \$1.3 billion, \$1.9 billion and 900 million. In the central alignment there are projects, namely in Muzzafargarh and Bahawalpur. The blueprints of coal mining projects have not come out. But this will make Pakistan self sufficient in energy needs for next thirty years.

In the Western Alignment there are three projects. First is a coal based power project at Port Qasim in Karachi at a cost of \$1.8 billion. Then there are two projects in Gwadar. In the Gwadar port and free zone there will be an expansion of the port, including two thousand acres of land for a free zone to be completed at a budget of \$5 million by 2016-17. Next comes the Gwadar International Airport which will be able to accommodate planes like Airbus A-380 and Boeing-777. It is to be completed at a cost of \$213 million by 2017. The total cost of the above mentioned projects comes to \$14.76 billion.

Andrew Small says that there are a number of mysteries regarding the OBOR policy initiatives<sup>xxvi</sup>. It may be a part of Chinese grand strategy to fulfill the Chinese Dream to become the greatest power on earth. Chinese scholars keep explicating the uniqueness of the Chinese Dream. Since then the notion of China Dream began to spread beyond officialdom. As Xi Jinping came to power in 2012 the idea of China dream has become a staple of intellectual and academic discourse.

By mid-2014, 8,249 articles with ‘‘China Dream’’ in the title had already appeared in China, according to the CNKI China academic journals database<sup>xxvii</sup>. These articles on Chinese Dream have normally been contrasted with the dreams of the US, Europe, India and Turkey. A natural conclusion emerges that Chinese Dream is the best model of ordering economy, society and foreign policies of China.

The Chinese scholars maintain that the Chinese dream is a unique gift of Xi Jinping to the people of China. Its inner meaning is that of holding and developing Socialism with Chinese characteristics: a rich and powerful country revitalizing the nation, enhancing the well being of the people and three thousand years old Chinese culture and civilization<sup>xxviii</sup>.

Some American scholars have called this attitude as ‘‘nostalgic futurology’’<sup>xxix</sup>. In this context OBOR is the first flowering of the Chinese Dream which combines the spread of China’s economic and military power in Asia and Africa.



There is a deep disquiet over OBOR and Chinese dream among the intellectuals and diplomats of India. This is because OBOR has come at a time when the US has entered into a phase of unpredictability and incoherence in its global role. It is on the retreat in Asia and Africa.

Since August 2016 China is hinting that OBOR is good for the whole of Asia and Africa. Therefore, China wants India to join CPEC so that Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan and Myanmar will be connected with infrastructure and massive projects<sup>xxx</sup>.

The Modi government has firmly refused to sign up to the Chinese OBOR initiative. It did not participate in the inaugural function of the Belt and Road Initiative held in Beijing in May, 2017.

The people who are against India joining OBOR have several arguments. That India should not be entangled in the Chinese web. Firstly, China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is hardly economic. Rather its aim is to provide China access to the Gwadar port to serve the military goals of China and Pakistan<sup>xxxi</sup>. Secondly, CPEC project has emerged by keeping India out of loop. So it is not a regional cooperative project. India is the biggest country in the region and with the capacity to contribute to it if it would have been consulted. Therefore, China's claim that CPEC will serve the interest of India is not only disingenuous but also a way to legitimize Gilgit-Baltistan as part of Pakistan. Thus CPEC is not an economic development project but a strategic attempt to weaken India<sup>xxxii</sup>.

CPEC passing through Pakistan Occupied Kashmir is India's territory. China is behaving like a hegemon in its quest for implementing CPEC. On the other hand, some Indian scholars maintain that instead of confrontation, India should go for cooperation with China. Srinath Raghvan argues that the, "Asian economic order is set to undergo far-reaching changes. By refusing to take a realistic track, India is depriving itself of an opportunity to shape the transforming landscape of Asia"<sup>xxxiii</sup>.

A strong argument for India joining OBOR has been given by Shiv Shanker Menon, former Foreign Secretary and National Security Advisor from 2010-14. According to him, the Belt and Road Initiative," does represent an opportunity for India". Even if some portion of what is proposed in the BRI is implemented, it will markedly change the economic and strategic landscape within which we operate"<sup>xxxiv</sup>.

Menon has explained in detail the needs of India to be a great power in his book Choices: Inside the Making of Indian Foreign Policy. He argues for India joining OBOR because," its transformation requires engagement with

the world, enhancing security in its neighborhood; contributing within its capacity to global public goods such as the freedom of the seas, and shaping outcomes on crucial issues such as energy security and climate change<sup>xxxv</sup>. Menon also reminds us that in the past countries like Germany and Japan could not retain their hold as great powers. He says that, "history is replete with examples of rising powers that prematurely thought their time had come, that mistook influence and weight for real power. Their rise, like that of Wilhemine Germany or Imperial Japan, was cut short prematurely". Menon's advice is that, "speak softly and carry a big stick is likely to be more productive policy for India to mobilize in dealing with the consequences of China's rise". By following this path India can become a great power<sup>xxxvi</sup>.

### Continuity in Sino-Pakistan and India Relations

In the seven decades since the creation of Pakistan there are several continuities in China-Pakistan relations. They are:

1. Despite recent attempts of China to extend One Belt One Road (OBOR) as a way to combine geo-economic pull with geo-political push it appears in future it will remain geo-strategic transactions.
2. On the other hand, India-China relations will have largely geo-economic matrix in the next twenty years. At the same time the fundamental differences between both countries on issues like Tibet, Jammu & Kashmir may keep growing. This is because of high economic growth of China and India.
3. It appears likely that Pakistan's revisionist attitude will predominate in its strategic culture. So Pakistan would not abandon the policy of asymmetrical/irregular warfare under the cover of nuclear weapons against India.
4. The Sino-Pakistan collusion originated in the realpolitik of the Cold War of the 1950's. It has acquired geo-strategic significance in the great power rivalry in the twenty-first century. This is because India has developed the status of a swing state that is capable of swinging the balance of power in favour of either the US or China. The swing potential of India will grow as a geo-strategic factor with the growth in its economic, political and military capacities.
5. The geo-political rivalry between India and China may continue for a long time. Hence the usefulness of Pakistan to China will remain the matrix of India and Sino-Pakistan relations. Some of the aspects of geopolitical rivalry are:
  - (a). China's opposition to India's claim to permanent membership of the UN Security Council.
  - (b). India's energy and trade quest in Central Asian Region and West Asia.
  - (c). India's attempt to have policing role in the Indian Ocean.

6. The geo-political rivalry between India and China is further accentuated by the following factors:
  - (a). China's One Belt One Road(OBOR) policy to influence the Eurasian geo-strategy and geo-economics.
  - (b). Sino-Indian boundary issue remains highly complicated by Pakistan gifting Shaksgam Valley to China.
7. The India-China relations are also in conflict for the following factors:
  - (a). Status of Arunachal Pradesh- During the Sino-Indian war of 1962, the Chinese forces occupied a large part of Arunachal Pradesh ie about 20,000 sq miles of Indian territory. On November 20, 1962 The Chinese government unilaterally announced a ceasefire, and withdrew from Arunachal Pradesh. However, since the last ten years, China has reversed its position, and claims that Arunachal Pradesh is South Tibet; so it belongs to China.
  - (b). Stapled Visa Issue- Stapled visa issued to Indian citizens of Arunachal Pradesh is another irritant between the two countries. In 2009 Chinese started using stapled visas also to the residents of Kashmir. In consequence China refused a visa to Lt.General Jaswal,head of Indian Army's Northern Command responsible for J&K. He was to lead a military delegation to China. Beijing told Delhi as Jaswal was posted in Kashmir which was a disputed territory so he was issued a staple visa. In 2011 on India's protest China had to retract and started issuing regular visas to Kashmiris. However stapled visa is still being issued to the residents of Arunachal Pradesh.
  - (c). Nuclear Suppliers Group/NSG issue- China's stand on NSG has virtually spoiled India's membership to this body. Except China other great powers have agreed that india should be made a member of NSG without signing the CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty). India has always maintained that its position regarding CTBT is voluntary and unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing. But china is unyielding. It demands that if India becomes a member of NSG without signing cTBT then Pakistan should also be allowed to be member of NSG.
  - (d). China has blocked UN ban on Jaish-e-Mohammed chief Masood Azhar on superficial pretexts in order to please Pakistan. It says it wants solid evidence to implicate him.
8. Despite complex and contradictory geo-strategic pulls the US and China have seen to it that Indo-Pakistan conflict does not grow to uncontrolled spiral. In 1965 war China remained neutral. The same thing happened in 1971 war. China remained quiet. The Kargil War of 1999 took place in the wake of nuclearisation of India as well as Pakistan. Both US and china united in their efforts to resolve the Kargil issue and Pakistan must retreat from Kargil Mountains. Therefore, it appears that in a conflict between India and Pakistan both the US and China will see to it that it does not come to mutually assured destruction.

## CONCLUSION

Since 1949 China has been assiduously working to develop relations with India and Pakistan in hegemonic terms. As these three countries are part of the Asian landmass, China's policy has been of containment of India so that it does not become a rival. Indo-Pakistan hostility has provided a perfect opportunity for China not only to establish a balance of power in South Asia but also a way to establish a presence in the Indian Ocean. It is in this context that China's One Road (OBOR) strategy is an ambitious plan to have military and economic hegemony in the Indo-Pacific region.

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