RADICAL EMOTIVISM: A CRITICAL RESUME

*DR. RAJKUMAR MODAK

*Assistant Professor , Department of Philosophy, Sidho-Kanho-Birsha University, Purulia, West Bengal, India

ABSTRACT:

Moral philosophy is concerned with those lively principles which are the fundamentals in moral philosophy. Therefore, for a moral philosopher, it is one of the main tasks to find out the basis of the justification of moral value statements, because unless and until the problem of justification of moral value statements is resolved, uncertainty will prevail with regard to (i) the identification of a statement as moral value statements and (ii) assessment of the worth of moral value statements. This will have a serious impact on the real life of the people desiring to live in world of morally permissible actions and interactions leading to uninterrupted peace and harmony. A search for the solution of the problem of justification of moral value statements is the need of the time. Attempts are made by different Meta-ethical theories such as Ethical Naturalism, Ethical Intuitionism, Ethical Descriptivism, Ethical Prescriptivism, Ethical Realism etc. to go deep into the problem with a view to reaching a solution. This paper is concerned with a critical resume of Ayer's view which is known as 'Radical Emotivism' in moral philosophy to provide the basis of justification of moral value statements.

0.1 Scientists consider that without natural law no natural event can occur. They suggest that it is the tasks of a scientist (i) to make the tools, apparatuses, equipments etc. and (ii) to invent the methods through which the occurrences of an event in the universe can be explained following the law of nature. The discovery of Gravitational Law by Sir Isaac Newton, for example, is the explanation of the each falling object in the earth. Philosophers, on the other hand, are concerned with those dynamic principles which are the fundamentals of human thoughts in order to understand ontology. Moral philosophy, as usual, deals with those lively principles which are the fundamentals in moral philosophy. Therefore, for a moral philosopher, it is one of the main tasks to find out the basis of the justification of moral value statements, because unless and until the problem of justification of moral value statements is resolved, uncertainty will prevail with regard to (i) the identification of a statement as moral value statements and (ii) assessment of the worth of moral value statements. This will have a

serious impact on the real life of the people desiring to live in world of morally permissible actions and interactions leading to uninterrupted peace and harmony. A search for the solution of the problem of justification of moral value statements is the need of the time.

0.2 Attempts are made by different Meta-ethical theories such as Ethical Naturalism, Ethical Intuitionism, Ethical Descriptivism, Ethical Prescriptivism, Ethical Realism etc. to go deep into the problem with a view to reaching a solution. This paper is concerned with a critical resume of Ayer's view which is known as 'Radical Emotivism' in moral philosophy to provide the basis of justification of moral value statements.

1.1 David Hume, one of the epoch making philosophers, draws our attention about the distinction between fact and value. Being an empiricist, Hume says that knowledge comes through experience; and experience is the basis on which we should arrange not only the ontology, but also moral philosophy. The slogan of Hume's empiricism is "No impression, no idea"—"I can have the idea of 'x', if and only if I have an impression of a sensation of 'x' ". In Hume's own language 'All the perceptions of the human mind resolved themselves into two distinct kinds, which I shall call *impressions* and *ideas*.'[1][1]

1.2 Hume would assert the existence of all matters of fact on the ground that we have an impression of the same. What we call moral value is something which cannot be sensed. In other words, we cannot expect to have an impression of moral value. The result is that moral value or goodness falls outside the world of fact. It is not the case that Hume would banish all values either from our discourse or from our mind. Value statements are made, although they are not included in the sensible world of fact. In Hume's opinion value is a projection of our sentiment and it is not a fact as we ordinarily understand it. He says, 'It maintains that morality is determined by sentiment. It defines virtue to be whatever mental action or quality gives to a spectator the pleasing sentiment of approbation; and vice the contrary.'[2][2]

2.1 Being a Logical Positivist, A. J. Ayer seems to be one of the accurate successors of Hume, as Ayer also concludes that moral value statements are the expression of our emotions. But Ayer's conclusion about the nature of moral value statements that is to say 'moral value statements are the expression of our emotions' does not depends on the same Humean principle —"I can have the idea of 'x', if and only if I have an impression of a sensation of 'x'. "

[1] Hume, David : *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Collins, Great Britain, 1962, P-45

[2] Hume David: *An Enquiry Concerning the Principle of Morals,* The Project Gutenberg E-book, 2010

2.2 To derive the conclusion that 'moral value statements are the expression of our emotions' the methods which are used by Ayer are very much fundamental, logical, analytical and also critical. At first Ayer enquires 'whether statements of ethical value can be translated into statements of empirical fact'[33].

2.2.1 Ayer takes this inquiry seriously, because (i) a subjectivist define the goodness of an action in terms of feeling of approval of a certain person or a certain group of persons has towards the action, and (ii) a utilitarian define the goodness of an action in terms of the pleasure, or happiness, or satisfaction to which these give rise.

2.2.2 He has rejected the subjectivism and the utilitarianism on the ground of the logical law of contradiction. He says that there is no contradiction in thinking that an action is good, because it is shored up by the feeling of the approval of a certain person or a certain group of persons. And an action is bad, because it is not shored up by the feeling of the approval of a certain person or a certain group of persons. Similarly, against, utilitarianism he tells that when it is said that an action is good, because it promotes greatest happiness to the greatest number and an action is bad, because it fails to promote greatest happiness to the greatest number, no contradiction arises.

And therefore we should, I think, conclude that the validity of ethical judgements is not determined by the felicific tendencies of actions, any more than, by the nature of people's feelings; but that it must be regarded as 'absolute' or 'intrinsic', and not empirically calculable.[44]

2.2.3 Here the expression 'empirically calculable' is very significant. By these terms Ayer tries to mention that the language through which philosophy should be dealt is scientific language and in this language either analytic statements are valid or synthetic i.e. empirical statements are valid. The moral value statements are neither analytic nor empirical, so, these are not the subject matter of scientific language.

2.2.4 According to him, moral value statements are cognitively meaningless. He is also in the opinion that moral value statements are not knowable to us; because in order to be knowable, a cognitive statement has to fulfill some conditions, which moral value statements fail to fulfill. So, these statements are cognitively meaningless.

2.3 Now, it is better to discuss the basic tenet of Radical Emotivism and the steps to understand these steps as depicted in the writings of A. J. Ayer. The tenet, for Ayer is: "Moral value statements are not cognitive, but

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[3] Ayer, A.J. : *Language Truth and Logic*, Penguin, 1936, P-106

[4] Ayer, A.J. : *Language Truth and Logic*, Penguin, 1936, P-107

emotive and imperative." The following organic components (OC) of the tenet need to be understood first for having a clear vision of the meaning of this tenet:

2.3.1 OC-1: MEANINGFUL STATEMENTS

Meaningful statements are those sentences which have a meaning, be it a cognitive or be it an emotive meaning.

2.3.2 OC-2: MEANINGLESS STATEMENTS

Meaningless statements have neither emotive nor cognitive meaning, that is to say, these are neither true nor false and neither verifiable nor falsifiable. Example: 'Hing ting chat.'

2.3.3 OC-3: COGNITIVELY MEANINGFUL STATE MENTS

Cognitive meaningful statements are concerned with those sentences which give us the information and are either true or false. Their truth value can be verified or falsified. To be meaningful, a statement has to be knowable. But there must be some criteria through which a statement can be knowable, that is to possess cognitive value. The Logical Positivists, in course of eliminating metaphysical statements by fixing up the criteria of meaning-fullness of statements, have mentioned that only synthetic or analytic statements can be meaningful. Being a member of the Logical Positivist group, Ayer emphasizes the verifiability criterion of meaningfulness of a statement. According to this criterion, a statement is meaningful, if and only if it expresses something that can be shown to be true (verified) or shown to be false (falsified) on the basis of empirical observations. In this sense of meaningfulness, only synthetic and analytic statements can be meaningful. Synthetic statements are meaningful by virtue of the verifiability criteria.

Example: (i) There is coconut in Iceland.

Explanation:

We can easily imagine someone going to Iceland, checking each grocery store and kitchen cupboard, and eventually discovering a coconut. In this case, the person's observations of the coconut in Iceland would verify (i). Similarly, a team of observers might determine after long and hard work that there are no coconuts in Iceland. In this case, their observations would falsify (i). Since such observations are in principle possible, (i) is meaningful according to the verification criteria. So, the statement (i) is judged to express something either as true or as false.

Analytic statements, on the other hand, are meaningful by virtue of the meaning of the words it contains, independent of fact. For example, 'All men are rational beings.' is meaningful by virtue of the meaning of the words 'men', 'rational' and 'being.'

2.3.4 OC-4: COGNITIVELY MEANINGLESS STATEMENTS

Cognitively meaningless statements are those statements which do not give us any information regarding fact and are neither true nor false.

2.3.5 OC-5: EMOTIVE MEANING OF A STATEMENT

It should also be mentioned here that verification criterion of the meaningfulness of a statement deals only with the cognitive meaning. A sentence or an expression may lack cognitive meaning, but it may contain other meaning, one of which is emotive meaning. An expression such as "Ugh!", or "Bah!" or "Oh wow, far out!" does not have any cognitive meaning, but it can be used to give vent to, or express, certain emotions.

The emotively meaningful statements may be of the following types:

• Expressive: Such a statement gives vent to an emotion, but is neither true nor false, and cannot be verified or falsified. Example: "Ugh!"

• Imperative: Such a statement is used to command, but is neither true nor false, and cannot be verified or falsified. Example: "Don't disturb others!"

 Explanation:

 When we utter "Ugh!" on seeing some too-disgusting thing, we express our feeling of disgusting emotion. On the other hand, imperative meaning is expressed a statement when we pass order to someone to do something through the use a sentence. For example: when we order to examinees "Don't disturb others!" the sentence "Don't disturb others!" is neither true, nor false, and hence, cognitively meaningless. However, this sentence has emotive meaning.

2.3.6 OC-6: MORAL VALUE STATEMENTS ARE NOT COGNITIVE BUT EMOTIVE AND IMPERATIVE

So, according to Ayer, moral value statements have no descriptive or cognitive meaning at all and these cannot be verified or falsified. These are used to express our feeling. In his own language,

In adding that this action is wrong I am not taking any further statements about it. I am simply evincing my moral disapproval of it. It is as if I had said, 'you stole that money', in a peculiar tone to horror, or written it with the addition of some special exclamation makes. [5]

Ayer gives another example to show that the moral value statements add nothing to the informative world as these are neither true nor false, but can only express our feelings or emotions. He says,

If now I generalize my previous statement and say, "Stealing money is wrong," I produce a sentence which has no factual meaning—that is, expresses no proposition which can be either true or false. It is as if I had written "Stealing money!!"—where the shape and thickness of the exclamation marks show, by a suitable convention, that a special sort of moral disapproval is the feeling which is being expressed. It is clear that there is nothing said here which can be true or false. Another man may disagree with me about the wrongness of stealing, in the sense that he may not have the same feelings about stealing as I have, and he may quarrel with me on account of my moral sentiments. But he cannot, strictly speaking, contradict me. For in saying that a certain type of action is right or wrong, I am not making any factual statement, not even a statement about my own state of mind. I am merely expressing certain moral sentiments. And the man who is ostensibly contradicting me is merely expressing his moral sentiments. So that there is plainly no sense in asking which of us is in the right. For neither of us is asserting a genuine proposition. [6]

3.1 The point should be noted—a moral conflict is no doubt is a moral disagreement which should be based on two contradictory statements of moral value. But following Ayer, this moral disagreement cannot be said to be based on the contradiction of two moral value statements. Because, the term 'contradiction' can be applied only to those two statements which are descriptive i.e. to say which bears truth value. In case of moral value statements only the feeling of disagreement is considered, which may be treated as emotive value not truth value. So, moral value statements are nothing but the expression of our emotion.

3.1.1 Ayer may say there would be no possibility of contradiction between two moral value statements, e.g. (a) 'telling the truth is obligatory' and (b) 'telling the truth is not obligatory'; because none of the above mentioned (contradictory) statements have truth value. What can be added here is that a moral disagreement in our attitude

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[5] Ayer, A. J. : *Language, Truth and Logic*, Pelican Edition, 1936, P-142
[6] Taylor, Paul W.: (Edited), *The Moral Statement Readings In Contemporary Meta-Ethics*, Prentice Hall International, London, 1963, P-121

can be represented in contrast with the moral rule followed by someone, because truth telling cannot be taken as absolutely right as it sometimes may be the cause of death.

3.1.2 Attempt may be made, now, to apply the verification principle of meaningfulness to a moral value statement. Let us take the following statement for example: Pain is evil. What sort of empirical observation would verify the statement? What we can say in this regard that we dislike pain after undergoing some pain, which increases blood pressure and pulse rate, or causes some other troubles. But that does not entail that the pain is evil. In general, then, it may seem that moral statements cannot be verified or falsified empirically.

4.1 Radical Emotivism is a moral theory of comparatively late date that opposes the earlier theories on the justification of moral value statement. Before entering into the discussion of main tenets of Radical Emotivism, let us see how Radical Emotivism opposes its predecessors on this issue:

4.1.1 According to Ayer, moral value predicates are not used to describe anything as like as an informative statements. No information is provided by a moral value statement. We have been taught by Ethical Naturalism that moral value statements have cognitive meaning and these can easily be translated into factual statements. But Moore, in his famous book *Principia Ethica* tells us that moral value statement can never be translated in the form of natural or factual statement. Moral value statements are known as self-evident truth through intuition. But Ayer holds a different view. As he says,

We shall set ourselves to show that in so far as statements of value are significant, they are ordinary 'scientific' statements; and that in so far as they are not scientific, they are not in the literal sense significant, but are simply expressions of emotion which can be neither true nor false.[7]

4.1.2 Here, the following statement of Fred Feldman is noteworthy:

The emotivists recognized, and wanted to account for, some important facts about moral language. For one, the emotivists wanted to emphasize that moral language, in its typical uses, is often accompanied by strong emotions. When a moral conservative says that communal living is evil, he usually speaks with some feeling. He isn't stating simply and coldly what he takes to be fact. Similarly, when a rabid organic gardener denounces the use of persistent insecticides, he is likely to have strong negative feelings towards the use of such chemicals.[8]

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[7] Ayer, A.J. : *Language Truth and Logic*, Penguin, 1936, P-104

[8] Feldman, Fred.: *Introductory Ethics*, Prentice Hall, London, 1978, P-212

5.1 In this context, let us peep into the opinion of R. Carnap regarding ethics as he was also a member of logical positivism as like as Ayer in order to get a clear conception of Radical Emotivism of Ayer. Carnap also holds that moral value statements are devoid of any descriptive meaning. He says that any moral statement like 'Killing is wrong.' is subject to analysis. The moral statements like 'Killing is wrong.', apparently seem to be descriptive at least for the reason that such a statement is presented in a sentence of subject-predicate form. But, according to Carnap, in spite of being presented in a subject-predicate form such a statement is not a descriptive one. In giving what would be the actual character of moral value statements, he says,

It is neither true nor false, it does not assert anything it can neither be proved nor disproved. Ethical and aesthetic propositions, and with them all other metaphysical propositions about the nature of Reality, have to be rejected because they deceive the unwary: they merely give 'the illusion of knowledge' without actually giving any knowledge.[9]

5.1.1 We may discuss the view of Immanuel Kant, here, to understand Ayer and Carnap's position clearly. Immanuel Kant and Both the logical positivists—Ayer and Carnap have rejected metaphysics; and in course of rejecting metaphysics they have casted their views about ethics. But their purpose of rejecting metaphysics is not same. Kant's purpose is to provide a scientific metaphysics by rejecting traditional metaphysics. That is why he has depicted how metaphysics as a science is possible in his famous book *Critique of Pure Reason*. Ayer and Carnap, on the other hand, have rejected any kind of metaphysics as it does not qualify the test of logical analysis. Carnap says,

Logical analysis then pronounces the verdict of meaninglessness on any alleged knowledge that pretends to reach above or behind experience. This verdict hits in the first place, any speculative metaphysics, any alleged knowledge by pure thinking by pure intuition that pretends to be able to do without experience.[10]

5.1.2 Again, Kant does not reject ethics. He has tried to establish morality on our practical reason. But Ayer and Carnap both disallowed any kind of moral philosophy by showing that moral value statements are devoid of cognitive meaning.

5.1.3 Actually, the philosophical movements named as 'Logical Positivism', has originated as a movement of the Vienna Circle. Ayer and Carnap themselves are the chief proponents of this movement. An evaluation made by

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[9] Carnap, R.: *Philosophy and Logical Syntax*, London, 1935, PP-24-25
[10] Carnap, R.: *Philosophy and Logical Syntax*, London, 1935, PP-24-25

Ayer, who is also a supporter of the movement lead by Vienna Circle, will be helpful to understand the position of Logical Positivism in a better way, 'It will be seen that the Vienna Circle did not accomplish all that they once hoped. Many of the philosophical problems which they tried to settle still remain unsolved.' [11]

6.1 Now let us focus on the main points of Ayer's analysis of the nature of the moral value statements, which are as follows:

▪   Following Moore, Ayer holds, 'Ethics is the general enquiry into what is good.'

▪   Ethical terms are pseudo terms having no cognitive meaning.

▪   Moral value terms cannot be translated into factual terms.

▪   Moral value statements are incapable of describing any fact at all. So, no question of truth-falsity is applicable in case of moral value statements. As for example, statements of the form "x is good or bad" have no cognitive meaning. They are used (i) to express positive or negative emotions, and (ii) to command others to have similar emotions.

6.1.1 This last point should need an explanation. Sentences of the form "x is bad." are not used to take assertions. Rather, these are used primarily to give vent to, or express, negative emotions, and to command others to have similar emotions. This constitutes an account of the connection between moral value statements, on the one hand, and emotions and actions, on the other. Moral value statements are not used to assert the occurrence of emotions; rather, these serve to give vent to those emotions. Hence, it is only reasonable that people feel strongly when they make moral value statements. The subject matter of ethics is as like as Aesthetic. So, moral value statements are excluded from any kind of scientific explanation.

6.1.2 Regarding the first point mentioned above Ayer's position is Meta-Ethical. Meta-Ethics is concerned primarily with the meaning, nature, application and justification of moral value statements and the moral value terms in particular.

The principal questions in meta-ethics concerning truth are the following: Is it legitimate or appropriate to apply the words 'true' and 'false' to moral judgments? If not, why not? If so, what do such words mean? What are the criteria for their application? How do these criteria differ from those for factual or empirical assertions? Do prescriptive and evaluative sentences express moral propositions?

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[11] Ryle, Gylbert: *Introduction in The Revolution in Philosophy*, Macmillan, London, 1957, P-86

Meta-ethical questions concerning method include these questions: Can any piece of moral reasoning be properly said to be 'valid' or 'invalid'? If not, why not? If so, what are the rules of valid inference which govern moral reasoning? How do they differ from rules of valid inference in other universes of discourse, such as mathematics, history, and the empirical sciences? What are the logical steps in the complete justification of a moral judgment? What makes a reason a good reason in moral discourse? What criteria of 'goodness' are involved? Can factual statements function as relevant reasons in the justification of a moral judgment? Can a moral judgment be deduced from any set of empirical facts? If not, why not?[12] [12]

6.1.3 It also seeks to understand the nature of ethical properties, utterances, attitudes and judgments. A meta-ethical theory, unlike a normative ethical theory, does not attempt to evaluate specific choices as being better, worse, good, bad or evil; rather it tries to define the essential meaning and nature of the problem being discussed. It concerns itself with second order questions, specifically the semantics, epistemology and ontology of ethics.

6.1.4 Following the second point, it is clear that Ayer's Radical Emotivism does not permit the moral value terms or the moral value statements to have cognitive value. To have cognitive value Ayer has thought that a statement or a term must be based on factual content. As moral value statements or moral value terms are not factual, these are cognitively value less. In the history of moral philosophy, it is observed that right from the age of Aristotle, Ethical Philosophers have tried to determine the nature of moral value statements. In this process, a concept of good i.e. value has been invariably contrasted with what is called the concept of fact. The discussion has given rise to a debate on the issue concerned with the relation between fact and value. The problem which has constituted the central issue here is:

…..whether fact and value are completely and irreducibly different, or whether one can be defined by or identified with the others.

6.1.5 As fact and value are different, moral value statements cannot be absolutely similar to or identical with factual statements. For example, the statement 'The knife is good' cannot be regarded as absolutely similar to or identical with the statement 'Ram is good'; because the first one is a factual statement, while the second one is a moral value statement. In the first form of statement, the term good has been used to describe an object knife, but in the second form of statement, the term good has been used in the sense of morally commendable. The first form of statement describes the factual or material quality of an object, and hence, it is as good as a factual statement like 'the knife sharp'. But the second statement is a moral value statement. The worth of a moral value

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[12] Taylor, Paul W. (ed.): *The Moral Judgment Readings in Contemporary Meta-Ethics*, Prentice-Hall, London, 1963, P-4

statement cannot be determined factually by assigning the state-mental value: truth or falsity. Therefore, the question that legitimately comes up to be addressed is: what will be the justification or rational basis of the moral value judgments?

6.1.6 As a matter of fact, moral philosophers belong to radically different two camps: one holding that moral value or good can be defined in terms of facts, that is to say, fact is the basis of moral value and the other camp holds that facts and value are so different that value can never be defined in terms of facts. Ayer belongs to the second camp.

6.1.7 The third point is a natural consequence of the second point. As moral value and fact are different, it is natural for Ayer to suppose that moral value statements can never be translated into factual statements and it is also true for an argument that no moral value statement could be derived as a conclusion where the premises are factual.

7 Let us now turn to some criticisms against Radical Emotivism.

7.1 OBJECTION—I: NO CONFLICT ARGUMRNT

In one respect, we may call Radical Emotivism as Subjective Naturalism. Because, according to Radical Emotivism the sole criterion for the justification of a moral value statement is emotion; and emotion is nothing but subjective feelings. Now, emotion, being subjective by nature, permits no conflict in passing any statement on a moral issue by an agent. That means, although there may be scope for inter-agent moral conflict, according to Radical Emotivism, there is no scope for intra-agent moral conflict. If someone says "Thrift is good" and others say, "Thrift is bad", then according to Radical Emotivism each one (agent) has given vent to an emotion and issued a command, but none of them has said anything true or false. So, for many philosophers, in such cases Radical Emotivism is wrong; because, as they feel, Radical Emotivism denies the presence of intra-agent moral conflict even when such conflicts really exist.

7.1.2 AYER'S RESPONSE TO THE ARGUMRNT

Ayer responds to this argument in an amazing way. He says;

The presence of an ethical symbol in a proposition adds nothing to its factual content. Thus if I say to someone, 'You acted wrongly in stealing that money,' I am not stating anything more than if I had simply said, 'You stole that money.' In adding that this action is wrong I am not making any further statement about it. I am simply

evincing my moral disapproval of it. It is as if I had said, 'You stole that money,' in a peculiar tone of horror, or written it with the addition of some special exclamation marks. The tone, or the exclamation marks, adds nothing to the literal meaning of the sentence. It merely serves to show that the expression of it is attended by certain feelings in the speaker.[13][13]

7.1.3 Ayer's respond to this argument, reveals that he has tried to make a difference between what is called disagreement in belief and what is called disagreement in attitude. A disagreement in belief occurs, when one person affirms a proposition, another denies it, and each tries to convince the other to change his belief. On the other hand, a disagreement in attitude occurs, when one person has a positive attitude towards something; another person has a negative attitude towards the same thing and each tries to make the other one change his attitude. In disagreement in belief we aim at altering each others' beliefs. But in disagreement in attitude we aim at changing each others' feelings.

7.2 OBJECTION—II CO-CHANGABILITY OF EMOTION & STATE OF MIND ARGUMRNT

The second objection comes from Brand Blanshard, who puts his argument with an example thus:

Suppose a person observes a rabbit in a trap. Feeling a great horror on thinking about the pain of the rabbit, the person uttered:

(a)It was a bad thing that the little animal should suffer so.

The above sentence, according to Ayer is moral; because it expresses the feeling of the pain of a person observing the suffering of the rabbit and it is also used to give vent to a negative emotion the person felt toward the suffering of the rabbit.

Suppose also that in course of time the person calms down, and in fact no longer has any strong feeling about the rabbit trap. Perhaps he has been given a tranquilizer, and as a result his present emotional state is quite unlike what it was previously. Now being asked to say what he thinks of the pain the rabbit is enduring he mutters:

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[13] Ayer, A.J.:, *Language, Truth and Logic*, Pelican Edition,1935, PP-110-111

(a)It was a bad thing that the little animal should suffer so.

The evaluation of the above stated sentence uttered (a) and the sentence muttered (b), according to Radical Emotivism, will be the following:

| Evaluation of sentence uttered (a) and sentence muttered (b) ||
Evaluation of (a)	Evaluation of (b)
It is neither true nor false.	It is neither true nor false.
It has no cognitive meaning.	It has no cognitive meaning.
It has emotive meaning, because it expresses the negative emotion of the person felt toward the suffering of the rabbit.	It has no emotive meaning, because it does not express the negative emotion of the person felt toward the suffering of the rabbit as the person was in a tranquil state of mind.

Form the above evaluation the following argument may be brought against Radical Emotivism:

The argument	
Premise-I	If Radical Emotivism is true, then (b) has neither cognitive nor emotive meaning.
Premise-II	If (b) has neither cognitive nor emotive meaning, then (b) has no meaning at all.
Premise-III	But (b) obviously has some meaning.
Conclusion	So, Radical Emotivism is not tenable.

7.3 OBJECTION—III

Another important objection may be raised following Gylbert Ryle. Ayer claimed that moral value statements have no cognitive value simply because moral value statements are devoid of any factual content. But following Ryle's point of view, we may say that there are two types of statements that bear cognitive value. These are: (i) statements bearing knowledge claim in the form knowing that and (ii) statements bearing knowledge claim in the form knowing how. Ayer could be right in denying that moral value statements have cognitive value, in case there would not be any moral value statement bearing knowledge claim in the form knowing how; which is, in fact, not the case. Ryle's argument on this issue is as follows:

This point is commonly expressed in the vernacular by saying that an action exhibits intelligence, if, and only if, the agent is thinking what he is doing while he is doing it, and thinking what he is doing in such a manner that he would not do the action so well if he were not thinking what he is doing. This popular idiom is sometimes

appealed to as evidence in favor of the intellectualist legend. Champions of this legend are apt to try to re-assimilate knowing how to knowing that by arguing that intelligent performance involves the observance of rules, or the application of criteria. It follows that the operation which is characterised as intelligent must be preceded by an intellectual acknowledgment of these rules or criteria; that is, the agent must first go through the internal process of avowing to himself certain propositions about what is to be done ('maxims', 'imperatives' or 'regulative propositions' as they are sometimes called); only then can he execute his performance in accordance with those dictates. He must preach to himself before he can practice. The chef must recite his recipes to himself before he can cook according to them; the hero must lend his inner ear to some appropriate moral imperative before swimming out to save the drowning man; the chess-player must run over in his head all the relevant rules and tactical maxims of the game before he can make correct and skilful moves. [1414]

Hence, Ayer's Radical Emotivism fails to establish that the moral value statements merely based on our emotion, not on our reason.

OBJECTION—IV

Kurt Baier has criticized the emotivists' view on the ground that moral value statements can never be analyzed in terms of emotion, because in ethics, for Baier, in a moral value statement the attitude that is expressed by the speaker to the hearer is pertinent. The function and the tendency of an emotive statement such as "Don't disturb others!" are not as same as the function and tendency of a moral value statement—'We should tell the truth.' Ayer seems be failed to grasp this point. Kurt Baier thus says,

It must be admitted that the impact theory emphasizes an important feature of moral statements: their tendency to influence hearers in certain comparatively uniform ways. It must also be admitted that certain other types of utterance, such as descriptive or narrative or scientific utterances, do not have this tendency. However, it does not follow from this that while the function of descriptive utterances is to say something, to make assertions or claims, to say what can be true or false, correct or incorrect, and so on, the function of moral statements is none of these, but merely to produce in others certain effects, namely, to arouse certain feelings and attitudes. [15]

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[14] Ryle, Gylbert.: *The Concept of Mind*, Routledge, London, 1949, P-16

[15] Baier, Kurt: "The Moral Point of View (1958)" in Paul. W Taylor (Ed.) : *The Moral Statement Readings in Contemporary Meta-Ethics,* Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1963

What Peter Singer has remarked, regarding emotivism, may now be remembered in this context. Singer says, if emotivism were right, then it would be impossible to say that there is anything in a moral value statement which can be known as true, because only emotions are expressible.

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