

## CHINA-PALESTINE ECONOMIC CORRIDOR OF THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE

**\*SHERIFF GHALI IBRAHIM, \*\*ALHASSAN ISAH ALHASSAN & \*\*\*ABDULKARIM ABDULLAHI**

*\*Department Of Political Science And International Relations, University Of Abuja*

*\*\*Department Of Political Science And International Relations, University Of Abuja*

*\*\*\*Department Of Political Science And International Relations, Nile University Of Nigeria*

*EMAIL: [sherfboy@yahoo.com](mailto:sherfboy@yahoo.com)*

*PHONE: +234-7063372013*

### ABSTRACT

*The purpose of this paper is to explore the China-Palestine economic corridor in the People's Republic of China's (PRC) Middle East Peace Initiative of 2017. This suggestion was made in the framework of the One Belt One Road (OBOR) vision or Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This vision has catapulted China's interest in the Middle East to new heights, and its stake in regional stability has increased substantially. The paper adopts the secondary method of data collection and findings show that, under its "business first" approach to the Middle East, OBOR gives China enormous leverage to influence regional processes in ways that it deems appropriate. The paper also adopts the realist approach to explain China-Palestine economic corridor of the belt and road initiative. The paper concludes that the China-Palestine Economic Corridor of the Belt and Road is a strategic one for China to bring together warring parties into economic bond. The corridor requires lasting peace for OBOR to succeed, which means that without peace OBOR cannot achieve its desired goals in the Middle East. China needs to carry out a drastic diplomatic and strategic move to ameliorate the conflicts in the region. The paper recommends that Political stability is vital to achieving the aims and goals of BRI, China should use diplomatic strategies to maintain regional stability in the Middle East and China should invest more in infrastructural development in Palestine to help them cope with some of the social problems caused by over 70 years of Israeli occupation, among other things.*

*Key Words: China-Palestine; Economic Corridor; Belt and Road Initiative; Middle East; peace; stability*

### INTRODUCTION

Following the Communist Party of China's victory in the Chinese Civil War in 1949, the People's Republic of

China was established under Mao Zedong. The People's Republic of China acknowledged the State of Israel, but in the 1950s and 1960s, the PRC began to support Arabs and Palestinians. During the 1960s, the PRC advocated for the annihilation of Israel and the establishment of a Palestinian Arab state in its stead. The People's Republic of China backed Yasser Arafat and the Palestine Liberation Organization wholeheartedly (PLO). China has also developed strong ties with the Fatah party. Under Mao Zedong's leadership, the Chinese Communist Party sponsored Palestinian armed factions such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) (DFLP). In May 1965, the Palestine Liberation Organization established a diplomatic mission in China. After the People's Republic of China was accepted as a member of the United Nations in 1971, it continued to support the Palestinian cause. During the summer of 1974, the PLO established an embassy in Beijing. In 1975, the PRC backed UN General Assembly Resolution 3379, which linked Zionism with racism. However, the resolution was eventually overturned by Resolution 4686 in 1991, a vote in which China (Charlotte, 2017).

Following Mao Zedong's death in 1976, a new Chinese Communist Party leadership took control. Deng Xiaoping cut down on assistance for Palestinian armed organizations. In 1978, the PRC stopped all funding for Palestinian armed organizations and backed the Camp David Accords. Despite Israel and the US's concerns, the PRC continued to assist the Palestinians and enthusiastically supported Yasser Arafat's November 15, 1988, declaration of independence in 5 Algiers, Algeria. The People's Republic of China recognized the nascent State of Palestine on November 20, 1988, and by the end of 1989, it had established full diplomatic ties with it. Since 1990, China has sent official diplomatic personnel to Palestine. Initially, diplomatic relations were handled through the Chinese embassy in Tunisia. China opened a foreign office in the Gaza Strip in December 1995, which served as a de facto embassy and liaison office to the Palestine Liberation Organization; nevertheless, the Ambassador to Tunisia remained to serve as the principal diplomatic officer to Palestine until 2008. In May 2004, the office, officially named Office of the People's Republic of China to the State of Palestine, was moved to Ramallah. The director of the office is accorded ambassadorial ranks in the Chinese Foreign Service (Charlotte, 2017).

On December 21-22, Beijing hosted the Palestinian-Israeli Peace Symposium, assuming a larger role in resolving the Middle East's most pressing issue. China conducted two such symposiums in 2006 and 2003, in Beijing and Jerusalem, respectively. The most recent was the first under Chinese President Xi Jinping's government. The symposium was attended by eight delegates from Palestine and Israel, as well as seven from China, including Gong Xiaosheng, China's Special Envoy on the Middle East Issue. Ahmed Majdalani, a member of the Palestine Liberation Organization's Executive Committee, and Yehiel Bar, Deputy Speaker of the Knesset and head of the Israeli parliament's push for a two-state solution, led delegations to the conference. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with both parties at Beijing's Great Hall of the People. During the discussion with Palestinian leaders, Wang stated, "China's stance is clear, and we have consistently supported our claim — that is, we support the establishment of an independent Palestinian state with full sovereignty, with East Jerusalem as its capital, and based on the 1967 boundary." Gong Xiao Sheng gave a news conference on December 22 and said that China convened the meeting to “play 6 active and constructive role in supporting the resolution of the Palestine-Israel issue” (Charlotte, 2017).

## CONCEPTUALIZATION OPERATIONALIZATION

This part will define and explain the following; foreign relations, international economic relations, bilateral relations, belt and road initiative.

**Foreign relations:** involve the aims and activities of a state in respect to its relations with other nations, unions, and other political bodies, whether bilaterally or through multilateral forums, are referred to as its foreign policy or external policy. Foreign policy is the content of foreign relations, comprising the aspirations and aims a country wants to achieve in its relations with other states and international governmental organizations (Borcan, 2010).

**International economic relations:** International economics is concerned with the consequences of international disparities in productive resources and consumer choices on economic activity, as well as the international institutions that influence them. It aims to explain the patterns and effects of transactions and relationships between people from various nations, such as commerce, investment, and transaction (Obstfeld, 2008).

**Belt and Road Initiative:** The Belt and Road Initiative, or BRI, is a global infrastructure development strategy launched by the Chinese government in 2013 with the goal of investing in nearly 70 countries and international organizations. It is regarded as the focal point of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) general secretary and Chinese leader Xi Jinping's foreign policy. During an official visit to Kazakhstan in September 2013, he first announced the strategy as the "Silk Road Economic Belt (People's Daily; Xinhua News Agency, 2016).

## RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

Objectives of this paper are hinged on the following:

- I. To discuss the China Palestine political and economic relations,
- II. Discuss China's role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
- III. To explain China's political and economic interest in the Middle East and Asia,
- IV. To discuss China Palestine relations and the BRI project in Asia and beyond

## THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This work adopts the realist theory to explain China's belt and road initiative. It explains well the causes of World War I. The realist theory is said to be the most influential theory of International Relations by holding the belief that the International System lacks security primarily because the system is characterized by anarchy. The realists are divided into three broad classes based on their views of the causes of interstate conflict as follows; Classical realism: the classical realists believe that conflict emanates as a result of human nature. The foremost proponents of the classical school include: Thucydides, Niccolò Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes among others. Neo-realists: the neo-realists attribute the cause of conflict to the anarchic state system. Neorealism is further divided into offensive and defensive realism. Neo-classical realism: neo-classical realism synthesizes the ideas of the classical and the neorealist to understand the cause of international conflict (Donnelly, 2000). As an academic endeavor, realism is not necessarily linked to ideology; it does not support any specific moral philosophy, nor does it believe

ideology to be a major role in the conduct of nations (Wohlforth, 2008). Many realists agree to Clausewitz's political view of war, which argue in 'On War' in 1831 that war is a controlled and rational act, and "a continuation of political action by different methods" (Brown and Ainley, 2009, p115).

The relevance of this theory to the topic is that, the struggle for global economic and political dominance among great powers is a reality. China is a rising power on the world stage and the BRI is a great strategy to expand investment in infrastructure and accumulate more wealth.

### **China Palestine economic corridor and the BRI from the prism of realism**

China has had a difficult neighborhood, with some unresolved territorial issues. The growth of China's economy and America's move to Asia complicate matters even further. China's neighbors are confronted with an external environment marked by increasing Sino-US tensions. It is usual to evaluate BRI from a realist standpoint, speculating that Beijing intends to use its economic might to lure neighboring nations into its orbit, eventually building a Sino-centric order in the area to 9 compete with Washington. Realists describe interests in terms of power, and they believe that international politics is essentially a battle for power and interests (Morgenthau, 1948). Realists believe that governments cannot overlook relative gains and are more concerned about the consequences of a future Sino-centric system formed by China's BRI. According to offensive realists, "the ultimate objective of any major power is to maximize its share of world power and eventually control the system" (Mearsheimer, 2014).

China is likely to follow this fundamental logic and attempt to become a regional good hegemon in Asia. China's BRI is viewed as one of the most important strategies to achieve the goal. Some observers claim that China's BRI serves the geo-political function of "killing two birds with one stone": "amassing strategic influence in Eurasia's heartland while deftly avoiding direct competition with the United States" (Wuthnow, 2017, p. 1). Some pundits make comparisons between the BRI and the Marshall Plan and regard BRI as China's Marshall Plan for the Eurasia. From the offensive realist perspective, BRI will substantially increase China's influence and interest in Asia, which "is likely to end up in an intense security competition with the United States and its neighbors" (Mearsheimer, 2014).

The realists emphasize the political and security implications of China's BRI and are generally pessimistic about the future characterized by the inevitable Sino-US competitions and conflicts. Arguably, BRI reflects the realist argument that Beijing pays some more attention to neighboring diplomacy and intends to improve its surrounding environment. However, this does not mean that Beijing will simply follow the offensive realist logic to pursue regional hegemon and be structurally determined to conflict with Washington. Kirshner argued that the offensive realist prediction that China will bid for the regional hegemon is contradictory with its assumption that "survival is the number one goal of great powers", because 10 "most great powers are extremely likely to survive while most great powers that bid for hegemony do not" (Kirshner, 2012, p. 61). Chinas political, strategic, economic and political interest in the Middle East cannot be overemphasized; from the economic viewpoint; most of Chinas energy supply comes from the Middle East, hence maintaining a stable middle-east Asia is of paramount importance to China. At the heart of this political tension is the Israeli/Palestinian issue which has existed for decades; hence China has a difficult task to maintain a balancing act of diffusing these tensions on one hand while

enabling its economic expansionism and the belt and road project on the other. In July 2013, China announced its peace initiative for the Israeli/Palestinian conflict and it, attracted attention even though it did not include new ideas or prospects for a resumption of Israeli-Palestinian talks. Neither was starting such a peace initiative a sufficient reason for attention since this is certainly not the first time that China has presented one. Every now and then China comes up with a diplomatic proposal to resolve the conflicts of the Greater Middle East. In 2014, China made a five-point proposal to end the Gaza armed conflict raging that year and in 2012 Beijing produced a four-point proposal to end the Syrian civil war. As for the wide-ranging Israeli-Palestinian conflict specifically, the last Chinese proposal was in 2013 (Roie, 2018 p5).

## **HISTORY OF CHINA-PALESTINE POLITICAL RELATIONS**

Following the Communist Party of China's victory in the Chinese Civil War in 1949, the People's Republic of China was established under Mao Zedong. The People's Republic of China acknowledged the State of Israel, but in the 1950s and 1960s, the PRC began to support Arabs and Palestinians. During the 1960s, the PRC advocated for the annihilation of Israel and the establishment of a Palestinian Arab state in its stead. The People's Republic of China backed Yasser Arafat and the Palestine Liberation Organization wholeheartedly (PLO). China has also built strong ties with the Fatah party. The Chinese Communist Party, led by Mao Zedong, backed Palestinian armed factions such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) (DFLP). In May 1965, the Palestine Liberation Organization opened a diplomatic mission in China. After the People's Republic of China was admitted to the United Nations in 1971, it continued to support the Palestinian cause. During the summer of 1974, the PLO erected an embassy in Beijing. In 1975, the PRC backed UN General Assembly Resolution 3379, which linked Zionism with racism. However, the resolution was eventually overturned by Resolution 4686 in 1991, a vote in which China abstained (Roie, 2018 p5).

Following Mao Zedong's death in 1976, a new Chinese Communist Party leadership took control. Deng Xiaoping cut down on assistance for Palestinian armed organizations. In 1978, the PRC stopped all funding for Palestinian armed organizations and backed the Camp David Accords. Despite Israel and the US's concerns, the PRC continued to assist the Palestinians and enthusiastically supported Yasser Arafat's November 15, 1988, declaration of independence in Algiers, Algeria. The People's Republic of China recognized the nascent State of Palestine on November 20, 1988, and by the end of 1989, it had established full diplomatic ties with it. Since 1990, China has sent official diplomatic personnel to Palestine. Initially, diplomatic relations were handled through the Chinese embassy in Tunisia. China opened a foreign office in the Gaza Strip in December 1995, which served as a de facto embassy and liaison office to the Palestine Liberation Organization; nevertheless, the Ambassador to Tunisia remained to serve as the principal diplomatic officer to Palestine until 2008 (Roie, 2018 p5).

The office, formally known as the Office of the People's Republic of China to the State of Palestine, was relocated to Ramallah in May 2004. The director of the office is promoted to the rank of ambassador in the Chinese diplomatic service ("United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3379 (November 10, 1975) US President Donald Trump's announcement that Washington will move its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem has, of course, aroused vociferous reactions among the Palestinian people and their leadership. PLO Chairman Mahmoud

Abbas announced that the US can no longer be a fair mediator and said he is not willing to cooperate in US-led negotiations. China also declared its opposition to Trump's declaration, which it believes will only worsen the status quo. Beijing's effort to demonstrate its involvement in the region took the form of the December symposium, which was convened by President Xi and included representatives from both sides. The event was led by the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, his deputy, and the Chinese envoy to the Middle East; the Israeli side was represented by MK Yehiel Bar of Israel's Labor Party (the Knesset's deputy speaker and chairman of the Israel-China lobby); and the Palestinian side was represented by Nabil Shaath, foreign affairs advisor to Chairman Abbas. The symposium paper calls on both parties to renew negotiations, declare their commitment to the two-state solution, and maintain the Status Quo in Jerusalem (Roie, 2018 p5).

### **BRI and Chinas Energy Demand**

Securing energy supplies is a key component of the BRI's implementation in the Gulf. This is due to China's increasing energy demands, which are anticipated to reach 14.2 million barrels per day, as well as the Gulf's energy reserves, which account for 48 percent of the world's total oil reserves and 40 percent of the world's LNG reserves. In recent years, the area has supplied up to half of China's imported oil. The BRI is expected to facilitate Chinese energy firms' delivery of even larger volumes from the region. Lu Ruquan, Director of the Strategic Development Department of the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), affirmed this by stating that the BRI constitutes "oil roads" through which energy resources will flow between the world's major oil producers and China. As a result, the BRI, like the "Go Out" strategy implemented in 1999, has resulted in increased Chinese energy activity in the Gulf. These are energy-related agreements signed by Chinese and Gulf elites. The establishment of a strategic alliance with Qatar during the Emir of Qatar's visit to China at the end of 2014 was a significant example. Following this, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the Qatari government signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) titled "Qatar-China Joint Promotion of Related 14 Cooperation on the One Belt, One Road" (Office of the People's Republic of China in Palestine, July 17, 2017).

China and Saudi Arabia formed a high-level joint committee in 2016, with one of its six subcommittees in responsibility of the BRI. Importantly, China has been seeking to restart discussions with the Gulf Cooperation Council to conclude a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) (GCC). Although many of these frameworks have yet to be completed, they are all designed to reduce the political risks and uncertainties associated with the BRI's implementation. Chinese firms have been key actors in the BRI's energy dimension in the Gulf. China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), for example, inked a one-year crude oil supply deal with Aramco in March 2017 for the Huizhou refinery facilities. China Oil and Huajin Chemical, CNPC's trade divisions, have also been in negotiations with Aramco about oil supply to their respective refineries. In the instance of China oil, the agreements are planned to provide 13 million mt/year (260,000 bp/d) of crude to CNPC's new Yunnan refinery in western China, and the crude is scheduled to be supplied via the BRI-developed Myanmar-China pipeline. In terms of Huajin, Aramco is in charge of delivering Arab Heavy oil for the latter's 120,000 bp/d refinery.

### **Chinas stance on Israeli Palestinian conflict**

China has backed the Middle East peace process and the Oslo Accords in principle under Presidents Jiang Zemin

and Hu Jintao. Yasser Arafat visited China 14 times. His successor, Mahmoud Abbas, has also visited China several times. Following the triumph of Hamas, a Palestinian armed organization that advocated for the restoration of ancient Palestine, in the 2006 Palestinian elections, China declined to label the group as a terrorist organization, instead referring to them as elected representatives of the Palestinian people. The PRC Foreign Ministry corrected this statement in January 2006. In June 2006, the PRC allowed Hamas Foreign Minister Mahmoud al-Zahar to attend the China-Arab Cooperation Forum, despite concerns from both the US and Israel, but earned acclaim from Mahmoud Abbas. Following the 2008-2009 Gaza War, PRC Foreign Ministry Spokesman Qin Gang urged both sides to resolve disagreements via discussion and condemned the use of armed action in conflict resolution. Following the Gaza flotilla raid on May 31, 2010, PRC Foreign Ministry spokesperson Ma Zhaoxu harshly criticized Israel and asked Israel to genuinely execute UN Security Council resolutions and ameliorate the situation in the Gaza Strip by removing the embargo (Office of the People's Republic of China in Palestine. July 17, 2017).

During the November 2012 Operation Pillar of Defense in the Gaza Strip, a spokesperson from the People's Republic of China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs told reporters in a news conference that China expressed "concern" about the clashes and urged all parties, particularly Israel, to exercise restraint and avoid civilian casualties. On November 29, 2012, China voted in support of UN General Assembly Resolution 67/19, which elevated Palestine to the status of non-member observer state in the United Nations (United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3379, November 10, 1975).

During the 2014 Israel–Gaza conflict, PRC Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei responded to the violence on July 9, 2014, saying: "We think that using force and responding to violence with violence will not serve to solve problems and would only increase hate. We urge all sides to keep the larger picture of peace and people's lives in mind, to promptly implement a ceasefire, to stick to the strategic option of peace talks, and to push for an early restart of discussions." China voted in support of UN Security Council Resolution 2334, which condemned Israeli settlement 16 construction in the West Bank, and generally favors pro-Palestinian views in the UN. In a meeting with the Arab League in early 2016, President Xi Jinping reaffirmed China's support for "the establishment of a Palestinian state with its capital in eastern Jerusalem." Xi also launched a 50- million-yuan (\$7.6 million) assistance initiative for solar power plants in the Palestinian territory (Dave, 2020).

In an April 2017 meeting with Palestinian Foreign Minister Riyad al-Maliki, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi termed the lack of "an independent Palestinian" a "grave injustice." Wang went on to add that China supports Palestinians' aspirations to build an independent state based on the boundaries established before the 1967 Six-Day War, as well as the creation of East Jerusalem as its future capital. In July 2017, Xi Jinping delivered a further formalization of China's positions on the "issue of Israel-Palestine conflict" in his "Four Points," the first of which was that China supported the establishment of an independent, sovereign Palestine within the framework of the two-state solution based on the 1967 borders. At the United Nations in July 2019, Palestine was one of 54 nations that released a unified statement in favor of China's policy in the Xinjiang province (UN, 2019).

Palestine also supported the Hong Kong national security bill in the UN a year later, in June 2020 (Roie, 2018).

### **China Palestine Economic Ties**

Palestinians have praised China's pro-Palestinian rhetoric. In July 2019, Hamas commended Beijing for speaking out against Israel's demolition of homes in Jerusalem's Sur Baher neighbourhood, prompting China's permanent UN envoy to demand that Israel cease the demolitions while denouncing the violence against Palestinians. "The material dimension of the Sino-Israeli relationship is far more valuable (to China) than that with the Palestinians, and it is arguably a constraint on (Beijing's) ability or willingness to become a more active mediator." The majority of Israelis have favorable views of China. As a result, despite their political differences over the Palestinian problem, the Chinese wish to collaborate with Israel. At least two additional considerations may possibly contribute to Beijing's choice to avoid substantial engagement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict's politics (Cafiero, 2021).

First, the suffering in Gaza provides Beijing with an opportunity to portray the United States as an isolated force at the UN, while emphasizing that China's stance is supported by virtually all countries. Second, the humanitarian crisis in Gaza allows China to divert attention away from its own human rights atrocities against Muslims in Xinjiang, where Amnesty International has charged Beijing with "crimes against humanity." Last month, the Chinese representative to the UN urged Washington to utilize its power over Israel to stop the conflict in Gaza, claiming that "the US has every chance to demonstrate that it cares about Muslims." Although economic factors strongly influence Beijing's foreign policy in the Middle East and North Africa, China's opinions on the situation in Gaza and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territories are mostly based on diplomacy and political objectives. As a power that champions South-South solidarity against Western imperialism, Beijing cannot ignore the Palestinian cause; however, Palestine has less relevance to the ambitious Belt and Road Initiative than other countries in the region such as Iran, Iraq, Libya, and the Gulf Cooperation Council states (Cafiero, 2021).

## FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS

The Sino- Palestine relations, goes back to the 1950s and 1960s, when the PRC began to support Arabs and Palestinians: i. China voted in support of UN General Assembly Resolution 67/19, which elevated Palestine to the status of non-member observer state in the United Nations ii. China supports Palestinians' aspirations to build an independent state based on the boundaries established before the 1967 Six-Day War. iii. "The material dimension of the Sino-Israeli relationship is far more valuable to China than that with the Palestinians because it gives China an easy access to the Palestinian market. iv. China sees middle east Asia as a vital cog to its belt and road initiative v. Securing energy supplies is a key component of the BRI's implementation in the middle east and this is due to China's increasing energy demands. 4.6 Conclusion The Middle East is critical to fulfilling China's belt and road project's goals of economic stability and energy security. Because of China's increasing energy demand," the flow of energy resources between China and the Middle East is expected to be increased and expanded as needed. By the end of 2015, the Gulf had provided 110 million tons of crude oil, accounting for 75 percent of China's imports from Arab countries, while by 2017, Qatar had become the country's main LNG supplier, fulfilling about 35 percent of its LNG needs (Cindy,2006). With a projected rise in energy transactions and the completion of large-scale energy projects under the Belt and Road Initiative, many of which are currently under construction or are still to be developed, the BRI can alleviate China's energy problems, aiding the country's economic growth.



## CONCLUSION

The China-Palestine Economic Corridor of the Belt and Road is a strategic one for China to bring together warring parties into economic bond. The corridor requires lasting peace for OBOR to succeed, which means that without peace OBOR cannot achieve its desired goals in the Middle East. China needs to carry out a drastic diplomatic and strategic move to ameliorate the conflicts in the region.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Political stability is vital to achieving the aims and goals of BRI, China should use diplomatic strategies to maintain regional stability in the Middle East.
2. China should invest more in infrastructural development in Palestine to help them cope with some of the social problems cause by over 70 years of Israeli occupation.
3. China should play an active role as a neutral arbiter in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through its permanent seat in the UN Security Council.
4. China needs to invest more in alternative sources of energy, in order to be less reliant on middle-east oil.

## REFERENCES

1. Chris, Z. (2017), "China and Saudi Arabia Solidify Strategic Partnership Amid Looming Risks," China Brief 17, 3. March 02.
2. Chris, B. and Kirsten, A. (2009). *Understanding International Relations*; Palgrave Maximillian.
3. Cindy, H. (2006). "China's Oil Rush in Africa," The Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, July, <http://www.iags.org/chinainafrica.pdf>.
4. Deudney, D. and Ikenberry, G. J. (2021). "Misplaced Restraint: The Quincy Coalition Versus Liberal Internationalism". *Survival*. 63 (4): 7–32. [fmprc.gov.cn](https://fmprc.gov.cn) <https://thediplomat.com/> <https://jamestown.org/program/china-saudi-arabia-solidify-strategic-partnership-amid-loomingrisks/>.
5. Giorgio, C. (2021). How far does China's support for the Palestinian Cause go? ([trtworld.com](http://trtworld.com))
6. Gulf News (2018). "Adnoc Eyes Stronger Ties with Chinese Energy, Tech Firms," <https://gulfnews.com/business/energy/adnoc-eyes-stronger-ties-with-chineseenergy-tech-firms-1.2166315>.
7. Lawler, D. (2020). "The 53 countries supporting China's crackdown on Hong Kong". *Axios*. July 02, Retrieved 3 July 2020.
8. Lu, R. (2016). "'One Belt, One Road': China and the 'Oil Roads,'" *China Oil & Gas*, October <http://www.coag.com.cn/EN/Y2016/V23/I3/7>.
9. Roie Yellinek, (2017), *Chinese-Palestinian Relations: What's Really Going On?* BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 733.
10. *Times of Israel* (2017). "China Pushes Four-Point Israeli-Palestinian Peace Plan".. 1 August.
11. *Xinhua News* (2016). "Chronology of China's Belt and Road Initiative." 24 June 2016. Archived from the original on 25 June 2016.
12. United Nations General Assembly (1975). Resolution 3379, November 10.